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1   Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  B.A., Yale University; J.D.,Harvard University.  I gratefully acknowledge comments by participants in the conference on “FinancialModernization After Gramm-Leach-Bliley,” held at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law on May 18, 2001,where I presented a preliminary version of this article.  Special thanks go to Patricia McCoy, whoorganized the conference and provided very helpful suggestions.  I am, of course, solely responsible for allremaining errors.  Unless otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through October 20, 2001.
2  Act of Nov. 12, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 [hereinafter called the “GLB Act”]. For general discussions of the GLB Act, see Michael P. Malloy, Banking in the Twenty-First Century, 26J. Corp.  L. 787, 793-819 (2000); Michael K.  O’Neal, Summary and Analysis of the Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct, 28 Sec. Reg. L. J. 95 (2000).
3  The GLB Act authorized full-scale affiliations between banks and securities firms by repealingSections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall Act.”  See Act ofNov. 12, 1999, supra  note 2, § 101, 113 Stat. 1341.   The GLB Act did not repeal two other provisions ofthe Glass-Steagall Act – (i) Section 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh), which prohibits banks from underwritingor dealing in most types of securities, and (ii) Section 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378, which bars securitiesunderwriters and dealers from engaging in the business of accepting deposits.   Thus, the GLB Act removedthe Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms, but banks andsecurities firms each continue to be prohibited from engaging directly in the other industry’s core activities. See PATRIC IA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL  §§ 7.01, 7.02[1], 7.03[1], 7.03[3] & 7.04 (2000);O’Neal, supra note 2, at 99-100.  For discussion of the GLB Act’s removal of legal restrictions on affiliat ions between banks andinsurance companies, see Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and Afterthe Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 26 J. Corp. L. 723, 748-61 (2000).  1
HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO THE GROWING RISKSOF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES?Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.1IntroductionPassage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act2 in November 1999 marked the beginning of anew regime for regulating financial services in the United States.  The GLB Act swept away theprior legal constraints on affiliations among banks, securities firms and insurance companies.3  Asa result, all three types of financial institutions may now combine to form financial conglomerates
4  The GLB Act permits bank holding companies (viz., companies that control one or more banks)to become financial holding companies by registering with the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”).  The FRBhas general supervisory responsibility as the “umbrella regulator” of financial holding companies.  SeeO’Neal, supra note 2, at  104-06.  Nonbank subsidiaries of financial holding companies may engage inactivities that are designated as “financial in nature” in the GLB Act or in rulings made by the FRB afterconsultation with the Treasury Department.  See Act of Nov. 12, 1999, supra note 2, § 103(a), 113 Stat.1342-50 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(k) - (o)).  The GLB Act expressly states that “financial in nature”activities include (i) insurance underwriting, sales,  brokerage and portfolio investments, (ii) securitiesunderwriting, dealing, market making and brokerage, and (iii) merchant banking.  See 12 U.S.C. §§1843(k)(4)(B), (E) & (F); MCCOY, supra note 3, § 4.03. The GLB Act also allows national banks and state banks insured by the Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation (“FDIC”) to establish direct subsidiaries (known as “financial subsidiaries”) that conduct mostof the activities permitted to financial holding companies.  However, financial subsidiaries of banks maynot engage in insurance underwriting, insurance company portfolio investments or merchant banking.  SeeAct of Nov. 12, 1999, supra note 2, § 121, 113 Stat.  1373-81 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a & 1831w);MCCOY, supra note 3, § 4.06[1][a]; O’Neal, supra note 2, at 108-12. 
5  O’Neal, supra note 2, at 96.
6  R. Christian Bruce, Fed Approves Citicorp-Travelers Merger Creating World’s Largest BankCompany, 71 BNA’s Banking Rep. 449 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Bruce, Citicorp-Travelers Merger](reporting that Citigroup would initially have assets of $750 billion).  By the second quarter of 2001,Citigroup had grown in size to $940 billion and ranked first in the world in terms of both assets and marketcapitalization.  See Niamh Ring, Citi Surpasses Deutsche As No. 1 in Asset Size, Am. Banker, July 6,2001, at 2; The Business Week Global 1000, Bus. Week, July 9, 2001, at 75 (tbl.) (showing that Citigrouphad a market capitalization of $261 billion as of May 31, 2001, compared to $116 billion for HSBCHoldings, the second most highly-valued global bank).2
under the umbrella structure of a “financial holding company.”4     Even before the GLB Act was passed, the legal barriers to financial consolidation were“all but render[ed] . .  . moot” by the FRB’s approval of a merger between Citicorp and Travelers.5 This merger created a huge diversified financial holding company called  “Citigroup,” whichcurrently ranks as the world’s largest financial services organization.6  Proponents of financialmodernization hailed Citigroup as the first modern American “universal bank,” because it was thefirst U.S. banking organization since 1933 that  could offer comprehensive banking, securities, and
7  See, e.g., Yvette D. Kantrow & Liz Moyer,  Citi, Travelers: A Global Leader Takes Shape, Am.Banker, April 7, 1998,  at 1; Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella: Travelers and Citicorp Agree to Join ForcesIn $83 Billion Merger, Wall St. J., April 7,  1998, at A1.  As used herein, the term “universal banking”refers to a regime under which a single organization can engage (either directly or indirectly throughaffiliates) in all aspects of the banking, securities and life insurance businesses.  See ANTHONY SAUNDERS& INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN?  WHAT COULDWE LOSE? 84-86, 128-29 (1994) (adopting the same definition of “universal banking”).  
8  Edward J. Kane, Implications of superhero metaphors for the issue of banking powers, 23 J.Banking & Fin. 663 (1999) [hereinafter cited as Kane, Banking Powers], at 666 (quote), 669.
9  Under Section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C.  § 1843(a)(2), a nonbanking company isexempt from the activity restrictions contained in Section 4 of the BHC Act for up to two years after itacquires a bank.  In addition, Section 4(a)(2) authorizes the FRB to grant up to three one-year extensionsof this exemption period.   See Travelers Group, Inc.,  84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 985-88 (1998) (relying onexemption provided in Section 4(a)(2)).  In approving the Citicorp-Travelers merger, the FRB determinedthat about 25% of Travelers’ assets and 40% of Travelers’ revenues were related to operations that  did notconform to the activity restrictions contained in Section 4 (in its pre-GLB Act version). Thosenonconforming activities included, inter alia, underwriting life insurance and property and casualtyinsurance, investing in more than 5% of the voting shares of commercial companies,  and controlling anddistributing shares of mutual funds.  See id. at 985, 988.A federal appeals court subsequently upheld the FRB’s order.  The court concluded that the FRB’s“literal compliance” with the exemption contained in Section 4(a)(2) rebutted any argument that the FRBhad violated the “purposes” of the BHC Act.   Independent Community Bankers of America  v. Bd. ofGovernors, 195 F.3d 28, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  3
insurance services to its customers.7  The FRB approved the Citicorp-Travelers merger in September 1998, even though theproposal “challenge[d] both the statutory letter and regulatory spirit” of existing law andCongress had not yet acted on pending financial modernization bills.8  Based on an exemption inthe federal Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”), the FRB’s order allowed Citigroup to offersecurities and insurance services beyond the scope of the BHC Act for up to five years afterCiticorp merged with Travelers.9  In practical effect, the FRB gave Citigroup a five-year charterto operate as a universal bank and did not require Citigroup to  divest any of its nonconforming
10 See, e.g., Bruce, Citicorp-Travelers Merger, supra note 6.
11  Kane, Banking Powers, supra note 9, at 666.  See also Dean Anason, Advocates, Skeptics FaceOff on Megadeals, Am. Banker, April 30, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Anason, Megadeals], at 2(reporting that Cit igroup’s formation “was widely seen as a bid to push lawmakers to enact a sweepingoverhaul of financial laws,” and quoting Rep. Maurice Hinchey’s sta tement that Citigroup was “essentiallyplaying an expensive game of chicken with Congress”).
12  See Kane, Banking Powers, supra note 9, at 669.  For example, before Citicorp and Travelersfiled their merger application,  their leaders consulted with and essentially received advance clearance fromFRB chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and President Clinton.  Subsequently,Citigroup, together with other major financial institutions and industry trade groups, reportedly spent $300million (including lobbying expenses and political contributions) to secure passage of the GLB Act. Shortly before Congress passed the GLB Act, Citigroup appointed Mr. Rubin as its co-chairman.Citigroup’s representatives also played an active role in negotiations between congressional leaders and theWhite House over the final terms of the GLB Act.  Thus, Citigroup evidently enjoyed a very significantdegree of influence over regulators and polit ical leaders during the period between its formation andpassage of the GLB Act.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth,  Jr. , The Transformation of the U.S. Financial ServicesIndustry,  1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks,  2002 U. Ill.  L. Rev. Issue 2(forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, Transformation], Part I(D)(4)(b)(iv).  Indeed, Citigroup was widely viewed as the financia l institution that “benefitted the most” from theGLB Act.  Barbara A.  Rehm, No Merger  Wave, But Money Saved, Am. Banker, Nov. 7, 2000,  at 1.  Seealso Barbara A. Rehm, How Citi Got Busy to Speed Fed’s Merger OK, Am. Banker, July 30, 2001, at 1(stating that the creation of Citigroup “required significant political muscle” and “spurr[ed] Congress tofinally enact sweeping financial reform legislation”). 4
securities or insurance activities.10  From a political perspective, Citigroup’s leaders “boldly gambled that they [could]dragoon Congress . . . into legalizing their transformation” before the exemption period expired.11 Citigroup’s gamble proved to be well founded when Congress passed the GLB Act less thanfourteen months after the FRB approved the Citicorp-Travelers merger.  The regulatory andlegislative responses to the merger raise troubling questions about (i) the degree of politicalinfluence enjoyed by Citigroup and other major financial institutions,12 and (ii) the FRB’swillingness to pressure Congress by confronting it with the choice of either approving legislation
13  See Bruce, Citicorp-Travelers Merger,  supra  note 6 (citing arguments made by critics of themerger); Fed to Consider Citicorp, Travelers Merger, (New Orleans, LA) Times-Picayune, Sept. 22, 1998,at C5 (same).  5
to ratify the merger or forcing a potentially disruptive breakup of a huge financial conglomerate.13  Although the Citigroup merger and the GLB Act were landmark events, in a broader sensethey are byproducts of the fundamental restructuring that has taken place in the U.S. financialservices industry over the past quarter century.  The dividing lines between banks, securities firmsand insurance companies were eroding long before the FRB approved Citigroup’s formation andCongress passed the GLB Act.   This growing “homogenization” among the three financialsectors was spurred by rapid improvements in information technology, deregulation and financialinnovations that broke down traditional barriers between the three sectors. For example, sophisticated computer systems and new financial instruments (e.g.,commercial paper, junk bonds and asset-backed securities) made it feasible to “securitize” manytypes of business and consumer debt.   As a result, many customers that previously relied on bankloans gained access to financing from nonbank sources such as finance companies and the publicand institutional credit markets.   Additionally, advances in information technology and thecreation of new financial products enabled aggressive “niche” providers (e.g., credit card banks,discount brokers and mutual fund companies) to  offer low-cost cash management and investmentmanagement services to the general public.  In response to these developments, consumers shifteda rapidly growing share of their investment funds from traditional bank deposits and life insurancepolicies into mutual funds, variable annuities and other investment vehicles linked to the financialmarkets.  In combination, these developments caused a dramatic increase in competition and a
14  For a  detailed analysis of the industry trends descr ibed in the foregoing three paragraphs, seeWilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(A) & (C), II(A) & (B).
15  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part  I(D)(1) (describing rapid consolidationwithin the U.S. banking industry, and reporting that (i) the number of independent U.S.  bankingorganizations declined from 12,500 to 6,800 during 1979-99, and (ii) the percentage of banking industryassets held by the 10 largest banks grew from 23% to 49% during 1984-99).   The term “bankingorganization,” as used in this chapter, includes each independent bank and each bank holding company thatcontrols one or more banks.  Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term “bank” is used to refer to botha chartered bank and a bank holding company. 6
narrowing of profit margins in the markets served by banks, securities firms and life insurancecompanies.  In each of the three financial sectors, incumbent firms encountered declining profits from traditional activities, increased competition from outside entrants, higher risks from newlines of business, and growing pressures to consolidate.  Each sector is currently far morevulnerable to financial stress than it was during the early 1970's.14Large banks, securities broker-dealers and life insurers responded to these trends bypursuing a twofold consolidation strategy designed to defend their existing markets and capturenew sources of revenue.  First, market leaders within each industry sector sought to enhance theirmarket power by acquiring their traditional competitors.  Second, market leaders tried to diversifytheir activities by acquiring firms in other sectors.This program of consolidation has triggered a wave of mergers within and across thebanking, securities and insurance sectors.  In the banking industry, a far-reaching consolidationwas made possible by (i) new state and federal laws that removed longstanding barriers togeographic expansion, and (ii) lenient antitrust policies adopted by federal bank regulators and theJustice Department.  Since 1980, the number of banking organizations has fallen by nearly halfand the market share held by the ten largest banks has more than doubled.15  Three huge bank
16  See id. (discussing mergers in 1998 between NationsBank and BankAmerica, Bank One andFirst Chicago NBD, and Norwest and Wells Fargo).
17  See id. (discussing a merger between Fleet and BankBoston in 1999, and mergers that combinedJ.P. Morgan with Chase and FirstStar with U.S. Bancorp in 2000); R. Christian Bruce, Fed Clears FirstUnion, Wachovia Deal; Combined Institution Ranks Fourth in U.S., 77 BNA’s Banking Rep. 315 (2001).
18  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(2), II(C) & (D).
19  See id., Parts I(E)(2)(a)(i) & II(C). 7
mergers were announced in 1998,16 and four additional mergers of comparable magnitude wereagreed to during 1999-2001.17  As a result of this consolidation, the U.S. banking industry israpidly developing a two-tiered structure.  Within the next decade, it appears likely that a smallgroup of very large banks will control most of the industry’s assets while the remainingcompetitors will primarily be community-based institutions or specialized niche providers.  Similarpatterns of consolidation have occurred within the securities and insurance sectors.18 Cross-industry acquisitions have also become important in recent years, as a result offavorable rulings issued by federal banking agencies and the courts.  Even before the GLB Actwas passed, all of the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies had establishedsubsidiaries engaged in securities underwriting and dealing, and banks had made significantinroads into the insurance business.  At the same time, several large securities firms and insurancecompanies operated conglomerates that competed with each other and with banks over a widerange of financial businesses.19  The GLB Act has given further impetus to cross-industryconsolidation.  During 2000 alone, two large foreign banks acquired major U.S. securities firms,another leading foreign bank purchased a large U.S. insurance company, and Charles Schwab and
20  See John Tagliabue, Acquisition Highlights Swiss Flair for Managing Expansion, N.Y. Times,Aug. 31, 2000, at C20 (discussing Credit Suisse’s acquisition of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and UBS’acquisition of PaineWebber); Amy L. Anderson, Sales at Banks A Key Prize In ING Deal For ReliaStar,Am. Banker, May 2, 2000, at 1; Pui-Wing Tam & Randall Smith, Schwab, Going for High-End Clients,Sets $2.9 Billion Stock Accord for U.S. Trust, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 2000, at C1; Lee Ann Gjertsen,MetLife Has Big Plans for One-Branch Bank, Am. Banker, Aug. 17, 2000, at 1.
21  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 44, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1999); James R. Barth, R. DanBrumbaugh Jr. & James A. Wilcox, The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking, 14 J.Econ. Perspectives 191, 198-99 (2000).; Joao A.C. Santos, Commercial Banks in the Securities Business:A Review, 14 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 35, 37-41 (1998). 8
MetLife acquired banks.20       Advocates of universal banking contend that the creation of giant financial conglomerateswill produce three major benefits: (i) increased efficiency and profitability for financial firms, dueto larger economies of scale and scope, (ii) increased safety and soundness for financial firmsthrough a greater diversification of their business lines, and (iii) lower-cost services and improvedconvenience for consumers based on the concept of “one-stop shopping.”21  However, I stronglydoubt  whether these optimistic forecasts will be realized.  As discussed in Part  I of this paper, nodomestic or foreign firm has yet realized, on a long-term basis, the theoretical advantages ofestablishing a “financial supermarket.”  In fact, Part  I shows that big diversified financial providers have produced a largelydisappointing record over the past two decades.  Many domestic and foreign financialconglomerates have encountered serious difficulties since the early 1980's, and several of themhave abandoned their efforts to establish universal banks.  Similarly, mergers among big banks, orbetween banks and other financial institutions, generally have failed to produce substantialimprovements in efficiency, profitability, shareholder value or customer service.  Thus, theexperience of the last two decades provides little support for the assumption that financial
22  See infra note 43 (discussing the federal “safety net” and suggesting that it confers a substantialnet subsidy on banks). 9
conglomerates will achieve the rosy projections offered by advocates of universal banking.  Doubts about the claimed advantages of universal banks are buttressed by concerns thatfinancial conglomerates will intensify the problem of systemic risk in the financial markets.  Overthe past two decades,  leading banks,  securities firms and life insurers have pursued aggressivesyndicated lending and securitization programs, as well as speculative underwriting andinvestment activities in the markets for securities and financial derivatives.  These high-riskactivities have made large financial institutions vulnerable to serious losses during disruptions inthe capital markets.  In addition, the growing concentration of securities and derivatives activitieswithin a small group of major financial institutions increases the likelihood that the failure of anybig institution could create spillover effects and trigger a costly bailout by federal regulators.  A further threat posed by financial conglomeration is that regulators will feel compelled toprevent the failure of troubled securities firms and life insurers which are affiliated with majorbanks.  Consequently, the federal “safety net” for banks22 could be wrapped around entirefinancial holding companies, thereby undermining the ability of regulators and investors to controlthe risks of those entities.  As discussed in Part II(A) of this paper, domestic and foreignregulators are currently revising their policies in an effort to improve capital requirements andenhance supervisory and market discipline over large financial conglomerates.  However, Part IIconcludes that these new regulatory initiatives are unlikely to solve the underlying problems ofsupervisory forbearance and moral hazard, which are the inevitable corollaries of the “too big tofail” (“TBTF”) policy.  
10
Part III proposes a new plan for bank regulation and deposit insurance that is designed tocounteract the TBTF doctrine’s perverse effects.   Under this plan, financial conglomerates wouldbe allowed to accept FDIC-insured deposits only within narrow banks, and those banks would bebarred from making transfers of funds or credit to affiliates (except for lawful dividends out ofprofits).  The FDIC would be strictly prohibited from paying any uninsured claims when banksfail, and the deposit insurance funds would be completely insulated from the cost of TBTFbailouts.  Drawing on its emergency powers as “lender of last resort” (“LOLR”), the FRB wouldbear primary responsibility for dealing with financial failures involving systemic risk.  The FRBwould be required to recover the cost of TBTF rescues from financial conglomerates, becausethose entities are the main beneficiaries of the TBTF doctrine.  Three additional recommendationswould enhance both regulatory and market-based controls over the risk-taking incentives ofuniversal banks. I. Financial Conglomerates Are Not Likely to Produce Their Expected Benefits, andThey Will Aggravate Systemic Risk Within the U.S. Economy  A. The Creation of Big Financial Holding Companies Is Unlikely to ImproveEither the Efficiency or the Profitability of the U.S. Financial ServicesIndustry Based on the experience of the past two decades,  there is little evidence to support theview that large financial conglomerates will perform better than smaller or more specializedfinancial institutions.  Most empirical studies have not found global economies of scale or scope inlarge diversified banks, full-service securities firms or multiple-line insurance companies.  In eachsector, the biggest and most diversified firms have consistently produced lower profits and inferiorefficiency ratings when compared to smaller or more specialized competitors.  Thus, for example,
23  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(4)(b)(i), II(B)(2), II(C), II(D) &III(A). 
24  See id., Part I(D)(4)(a);  Ken Brown & Nikhil Deogun, Heard on the Street: The IncredibleShrinking Bank Premium: Wachovia Deal Illustrates Mood of Caution, Wall St. J., April 17, 2001, at C1(discussing serious problems encountered by Bank of America, Bank One and First Union after makingaggressive acquisitions in the late 1990's); Deal-making done, Economist, Jan. 27, 2001 (same). 11
(i) smaller regional and community banks and focused credit card banks are more efficient andprofitable than the largest money center banks, (ii) specialized discount brokers have producedhigher returns on equity than full-service broker-dealers, and (iii) specialized life insurers are moreefficient than multiple-line insurance companies.23 Moreover,  most large mergers among financial firms have failed to produce the“synergies” expected by advocates of consolidation.  The great majority of big U.S. bank mergersduring the 1990's generated disappointing profits and long-term losses in shareholder wealth. Several of the largest bank mergers during 1996-98 are now widely viewed as costlydisappointments or outright failures (viz., Bank One’s mergers with First Chicago NBD and FirstUSA, First Union’s acquisitions of CoreStates and Money Store, NationsBank’s mergers withBarnett Banks and Bank of America, and Wells Fargo’s hostile acquisition of First Interstate).  Allof these mergers produced major customer defect ions, rapid increases in nonperforming loans andlarge profit shortfalls.  The difficulties caused by these mergers, during a period of unprecedentedeconomic expansion, raise troubling questions about the potential problems that could emerge atlarge consolidated banks if the U.S. economy experiences a severe recession.24Cross-industry diversification has shown no more success than big bank mergers.  The“financial supermarkets” created during the 1980's by American Express, GE, Kemper, Prudentialand Sears have all been dismantled.  Since 1990, AXA, Bankers Trust, Barclays, ING, NatWest
25  For a  more detailed discussion of the developments noted in the preceding two paragraphs, seeWilmarth,  Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(2)(a)(ii),  I(E)(2)(c) & II(C).  For reports of decliningprofits from investment banking activities at  the five leading international banks during the first ninemonths of 2001, see, e.g.,  Jathon Sapsford et al., Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and FleetBoston SeeEarnings Slump, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A4; Liz Moyer, JPM-Chase, Fleet Feel Pain of SlowMarkets, Am. Banker, July 19, 2001, at 1; Liz Moyer et a l., Profits Off,  Citi, B of A Brace for More Pain,Am. Banker, April 17, 2001, at 1; Alissa Schmelkin, Credit Suisse Group Profits Tumble 23%, No UpturnForecast,  Am. Banker, Aug. 30, 2001, at 3; Marcus Walker, Slowdown Grips Deutsche Bank, Profit Falls49%, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 2001, at A10; World Business Briefing Europe: Switzerland: Bank Profit Falls,N. Y. Times, Aug. 15,  2001, at W1 (reporting a 33% decline in second-quarter profits at UBS).  Fordescriptions of problems caused by the terrorist attack in September, see Paul Beckett et al., CitigroupJoins Firms Warning Of Slim Profits, Wall St. J.,  Sept. 18, 2001, at A3 (reporting that  Citigroup would12
and Security Pacific have either been driven into forced mergers or decided to abandon the capitalmarkets business sector after ambitious expansion plans produced disappointing results.  Bank ofAmerica’s acquisition of Montgomery Securities proved to be an expensive failure, whileConseco’s purchase of Green Tree produced huge losses.  The most spectacular disaster occurredat Credit Lyonnais, which suffered huge losses after its merchant banking unit, Altus Finance,made risky investments in a variety of European and overseas enterprises.  The Credit Lyonnaisfiasco ultimately forced the French government to finance a $20 billion rescue plan for the bank.Five big international banks – J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, DeutscheBank and UBS – have continued to pursue a universal banking strategy.  However, all five bankshave incurred significant losses from capital markets activities at various times in recent years, andeven Citigroup cannot yet be declared a long-term success.  During the first nine months of 2001,a general slump in the world’s equity markets caused sharp declines in earnings from investmentbanking operations at all five banks.  In September, the destruction of the World Trade Center byterrorists inflicted substantial losses on Citigroup’s insurance operations and further depressed theearnings of major investment banks.  Thus, the diversification strategies implemented by all fivebanks have exposed them to material risks during disruptions in the financial markets.25
lose $700 million due to insurance claims and the disruption of financial markets); Niamh Ring, Merrill’sCuts Set Off New Talk of Sale, Am. Banker, Oct. 19, 2001, at 2; Emily Thornton, Wall Street: The BigChill, Bus. Week, Oct. 22, 2001, at 120 [hereinafter cited as Thornton, Wall Street].Another reason for doubting the long-term success of  universal banking is that, since the late1980's , major European banks have produced very disappointing results after acquiring investment bankingfirms in England and the United States.  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(2)(a)(ii);David Fairlamb, All that Glitters . . . European banks muff their U.S. buys, Bus. Week, Aug. 13, 2001, at44; Marcus Walker, Securities Work Taxes European Banks: Earnings Reveal Toll Of Withering MarketsOn Investment Units, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 2001, at A10.13
A major reason for the disappointing results of universal banking efforts is that mostcustomers (with the possible exception of very large corporations) have not embraced the conceptof “one-stop shopping.”  Consumers, small businesses and mid-sized firms have expressed astrong preference for diversifying their purchases of financial services among several providers. Customer at titudes help to explain why the “financial supermarkets” of the 1980's failed and whythe great financial success stories of the 1990's were focused providers – viz., credit card banks,innovative community-oriented banks, discount brokers and mutual fund managers.  Specializedfinancial firms have earned customer loyalty by providing superior service and/or betterinvestment returns at lower cost.  The Internet has greatly enhanced the appeal of specialty firms,because it permits consumers and smaller businesses to make inexpensive nationwide searches forthe most attractive combination of price and service.  In contrast to these focused competitors,big diversified banks and full-service securities firms have consistently charged higher fees andpaid lower returns on deposits or investments.  Indeed, one reason to  be skept ical about theclaimed advantages of “one-stop shopping” in a consolidated financial services industry is thatmajor banks have not delivered on their promises to provide bet ter service and lower prices in a
26  See Wilmarth, Transformation, Parts I(D)(2), I(D)(4)(b)(iii) & II(D).  See also Arthur E.Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True?, The Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 Stan. J. L.,Bus. & Fin. 1 (1995) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers], at 4-5, 31-41,  87 (contendingthat, despite optimistic claims made by advocates of consolidation, big bank mergers actually producedinferior service and higher prices for consumers and small businesses); Gerald A. Hanweck & BernardShull, The bank merger movement: efficiency, stability and competitive policy concerns, 44 Antitrust Bull.251, 258-59, 265-81 (1999) (presenting similar argument); Timothy H. Hannan, Retail Fees of DepositoryInstitutions, 1994-99,  87 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 8-11 (2001) (reporting that, compared with single-state banksand smaller banks, multistate banks and larger banks charged significantly higher fees on deposit accountsin 1999).
27  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(C), I(D)(4)(b), I(E)(1), I(E)(2) & II(C). See also Matt Murray, Critical Mass: As Huge Companies Keep Growing, CEOs Struggle to Keep Pace,Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 2001, at A1 (reporting that (i) “[m]any of the new behemoths created by [recent]14
consolidated banking industry.26   Three additional factors help to explain why most big banks and other large diversifiedfinancial firms in the United States have failed to generate the efficiency and profitability gainspredicted by consolidation advocates.  First, complex organizational structures and agencyconflicts often prevent financial conglomerates from realizing on potential synergies.  Second,managers frequently pursue expansion and diversification programs for reasons that have nothingto do with improving customer loyalty or shareholder returns.  Managerial hubris and self-interest– particularly the desire to avoid market and regulatory discipline by achieving TBTF status – arepowerful motivations behind many big financial mergers.  Third, executives must at least pay lipservice to “shareholder value” in an age of powerful institutional shareholders.  Accordingly,acquiring firms typically issue highly optimist ic forecasts about potential cost savings and profitgains when mergers are announced.  To achieve these forecasts, acquiring firm managers are tempted to seek higher returns by making drastic cuts in personnel and facilities, pursuing morerisky activities and increasing leverage. These aggressive strategies typically alienate customersand produce unexpected losses, often on a very large scale.27
mergers are floundering,” including “[a]cquisitive banks like Bank of America Corp. and Bank One Corp.,”and (ii) many corporate CEOs admit that “bigness has become a battle with a new kind of complexity and anew degree of turmoil”); Barbara A. Rehm, Departures: The Goodbye Boys, Am. Banker, Feb. 1, 2001(“Best in Banking” supplement), at 16A (reporting that, when asked whether a bank can be “too big,”former First Union chairman Edward Crutchfield replied: “I don’t know. . . . There is no question that sizebrings benefits.  But do they outweigh the downside of being slow, bureaucratic?  I’m not sure”).  
28  For a more detailed analysis of the comparative performance of U.S. and European financialfirms, see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(2)(a)(ii) &  III(A).  See also George G.Kaufman,  Designing the New Architecture for U.S. Banking, in BENTON E. GUP, ED., THE NEWFINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: BANKING REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001) [hereinafter cited asNEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE], at 39 [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, Banking Architecture], at 43-4415
In addition to the disappointing record of large financial conglomerates in the UnitedStates, it is noteworthy that European universal banks have been less efficient,  less profitable andless creative than the top U.S. banks and securities firms over the past three decades.  During thatperiod, major U.S. commercial banks have produced higher earnings and maintained betterefficiency ratios than the leading French, German and Swiss banks.  Similarly, the “big three” U.S.securities firms have dominated European universal banks in the international markets forunderwriting securities and advising on corporate mergers and acquisitions.  Most analysts at tribute the superior performance of U.S. banks and securities firms to thefollowing factors: (i) U.S. financial firms have faced much more rigorous competition in theirhome markets, compared to the big European universal banks, and (ii) as a result of thiscompetitive stimulus, U.S. financial firms have produced most of the major financial innovationsduring the past thirty years, including a broad array of mutual funds, asset-backed securities, over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives and other creative financial instruments.  These Americaninnovations have transformed global finance by encouraging a strong trend toward (A) replacingintermediated bank credit with capital markets financing, and (B) expanding the use of  riskmanagement tools based on sophisticated computer models.28  
(stating that U.S. banks have been more profitable than French, German and Swiss banks since 1960);Christos Staikouras, Geoffrey Wood & Rosie Denney, Bank Non-Interest Income: A Source of Stability?,Feb. 2000 (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=233905>), at 8-13 (including tbls. 3& 5) (showing that U.S. banks had a significantly higher average return on assets than European banksduring the 1990's).
29  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part III(A).  Over the past five years, mergersamong domestic and foreign banks and securities firms have created eight global investment banks – viz.,the “Big Three” of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch, along with Citigroup, J.P. MorganChase, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS.   The size and financial resources of those eight firms havecaused many analysts to question whether midsized securities firms (e.g., Lehman Brothers and BearStearns) can survive as effective competitors.  In this regard, a prominent former federal bank regulator haspredicted that global consolidation will ultimately produce a dozen  financial companies controlling “85%of the world’s private-sector financial services assets within 20 years.”  See Dean Anason, Welcome forReform Law Gives Way to Uncertainty, Am. Banker, Dec. 16, 1999, at 2 (citing prediction by EugeneLudwig, Deutsche Bank vice chairman and former Comptroller of the Currency); Randall Smith & CharlesGasparino, Heard on the Street: Lehman Tries to Thrive as a Solo Player As Mergers Turn Its Rivals IntoGoliaths, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 2000, at C1; Premier investment banks form global giants, 35 Mergers &Acquisitions No. 9, Oct . 2000, at 13 (stating that “[t]he implications of investment banking consolidationfor corporate clients have yet to be explored,” given “the reduced number of choices they face for [merger16
The comparatively poor performance of European universal banks over the past threedecades – like the failures of U.S. “financial supermarkets” during the 1980's –  creates substantialdoubts whether major financial holding companies will achieve the efficiency and profitabilitygains predicted by supporters of the GLB Act.  Past experience suggests that large, diversifiedfinancial organizations (i) will find it very difficult to produce the synergies expected from cross-selling, and (ii) will be hampered by managerial diseconomies, agency conflicts and unprofitablecross-subsidies between divisional units.  In addition, concerns about the longer-term effects ofuniversal banking have been created by the rapid pace of global consolidation among banks andsecurities firms and the growing concentration of market power in wholesale financial markets. Continued mergers among major international financial institutions could eliminate most midsizedinvestment banks, thereby reducing competition and innovation in the provision of capital marketsservices to large corporat ions.29    
and acquisition] and corporate finance services”). Rapid consolidation within the syndicated lending market provides another example of the potentialadverse effects of mergers and acquisitions on competition in wholesale financial markets.  During the pastten years, the top five agent banks increased their collective share of U.S. loan syndications from 26% to61%.  In a recent survey of corporate finance officers,  72% of the respondents expressed concern that thisconsolidation could lead to “monopolistic” pricing for syndicated loans.  Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett,Bank Roles: How Consolidation Alters the Field, Wall St. J., April 23, 2001, at C1, C9.       
30  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 44, supra note 21, at 4-6; Barth, Brumbaugh & Wilcox, supra note 21, at198. 17
B. Financial Conglomerates Pose a Significant Potential Threat to the Safetyand Stability of the U.S. Financial Services IndustryAdvocates of universal banking claim that a safer financial system will be created as banksdiversify into securities and life insurance activities.30  However, there are at least three reasons toquestion the accuracy of this claim.  First, consolidation of the U.S. banking industry during thepast two decades has not produced a safer banking system.  Second, financial conglomeration islikely to extend the federal “safety net” to include nonbank affiliates of major banks.  Third, theGLB Act will promote a greater consolidation of risk within the financial sector, because it hasremoved the structural separations that (i) previously shielded commercial and investment banksfrom problems occurring in the other sector, and (ii) enabled each sector to serve as anindependent source of financing during financial disruptions.1. Consolidation and Increased Risk in the Banking SectorDespite predictions that consolidation of the U.S. banking industry would create saferbanks that were larger and more geographically diversified, bigger banks have not proven to besafer institutions.  Large banks failed at a higher rate than small banks during 1971-91, andexcessive risk-taking by large banks posed the greatest threat to the stability of the U.S. bankingsystem during the banking crisis of 1980-92.  Several large interstate banks failed or came close to
31  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part  I(E)(1) (discussing the banking crisis of1980-92, supervisory forbearance granted to Bank of America and Citicorp after their near-failures, andthe FRB’s decision to relax its interest rate policy during the early 1990's).  See also Wilmarth, Big BankMergers,  supra  note 26, at  4-6, 41-61, 87 (contending that consolidation failed to produce a safer bankingsystem during 1980-95); Arthur  E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risksof Nationwide Banks, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 957 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail], at 984-94 (discussing the failure of Bank of New England and the near-failures of Citicorp, C&S/Sovran and FirstInterstate during the early 1990's); JOHN SPIEGE L ET AL ., BANKING REDEFINED 164-65, 199-200, 210, 421(Irwin Professional Publishing, 1996) (describing the near-fa ilures of Midlantic and C&S/Sovran, andstating that First Interstate “was almost wiped out by loan losses from acquisitions in Texas and Arizona,”id. at 421).
32  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(C) & I(E)(2) (discussing (i) higher risksassumed by big banks after 1992,  and (ii) large losses from trading, investing or securit ization activities18
failure during that crisis, because their poorly-managed growth and high-risk lendingoverwhelmed any advantages provided by geographic diversification.  Federal bank regulatorsgranted extensive supervisory forbearance to large troubled banks, and the FRB adopted a highlyaccommodating interest rate policy in order to  rehabilitate those banks in the early 1990's.31  Notwithstanding the painful lessons of the 1980's, big banks resumed their pattern of high-risk behavior almost as soon as they returned to financial health beginning in 1993.  During thepast several years, major banks have pursued rapid growth in risky lines of business tied directlyor indirectly to the capital markets – e.g., leveraged syndicated lending, underwriting junk bonds,investing in venture capital projects, dealing and trading in OTC derivatives, and securitizingsubprime consumer loans.  All of these activities have proven to be vulnerable to suddendisruptions or downturns in the capital markets.  At the same time, large banks have artificiallyboosted their per-share earnings by reducing their capital ratios and loan loss reserves,  therebyincreasing their vulnerability to adverse economic changes.  The current risks facing big banks arereflected in the large losses that several major banks have reported from trading, investing orsecuritization activities since 1997.32  In addition, compared to smaller banks, big banks as a
incurred by Bank of America, Bankers Trust and Citigroup during 1998, and by Bank of America, BankOne, J.P. Morgan Chase, FleetBoston, First Union and Wells Fargo during 2000-01).
33  See R. Alton Gilbert, Problem Business Loans Rise at Large Banks, Monetary Trends, Fed.Res. Bank of St. Louis, MO, Nov. 2000 (available at <www.stls.frb.org>) (showing that, during 1997-2000, nonperforming business loans and charge-offs rose at a much more rapid rate among banks that werelarger than $10 billion).  During the first quarter of 2001, three big banks (Bank of America,  Bank One andJ.P.  Morgan Chase) charged off nearly $2 billion in bad loans and still held almost $11 billion ofnonperforming loans at the end of the quar ter.  See Barbara A. Rehm, It’s Bank One, Wells, Fleet in Loan-Loss Reserves Derby, Am. Banker, April 27, 2001, at 1.  
34  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(C),  I(D)(4)(b)(iv) & I(E) (discussinghigher-risk strategies pursued by large U.S. banks since the 1970's) ; HENRY KAUFMAN , ON MONEY ANDMARKETS: A WALL STREET MEMOIR (2000) [hereinafter KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS], at 223-31, 242-46, 259-68, 278-86, 306-07 (same); Gianni De Nicolo, Size, Charter Value and Risk in Banking:An International Perspective, April 2001, at 3-4, 11-21, 24-25 (available at<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id+255465>) (studying the effects  of bank size on theoperating risk and insolvency risk of publicly-traded banks in 21 developed nations – including the U.S.,Japan and major European countries – during 1988-98).19
group have experienced a much more rapid increase in charged-off and nonperforming loansduring the same period.33   Consolidation of the U.S. banking industry thus appears to have promoted anintensification of risk.  Over the past three decades, large U.S. banks have shown a consistentpattern of shifting to more aggressive strategies as they grow in size.  Throughout this period, bigU.S. banks have operated with significantly higher leverage, less liquidity and a more risky asset-liability mix.  A recent study of banking systems in twenty-one developed nations found that theU.S. experience is not an isolated phenomenon.  This study concluded that the largest banks inthese countries engaged in more risky activities and, as a result, faced higher risks of insolvencyduring 1988-98.34    The TBTF doctrine – i.e., the policy of protecting both insured and uninsured depositorsin large failing banks – provides the most likely explanation for this correlation between increased
35  Federal regulators officially announced the TBTF doctrine when they rescued ContinentalIllinois in 1984.  In fact, however, regulators had implicitly followed a TBTF policy when they protecteduninsured depositors and other creditors at Franklin National Bank in 1974 and First Pennsylvania in 1980. In 1991, Congress provided a statutory basis for TBTF rescues by enacting Section 141 of the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”).  Section 141 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G)) authorizes federal regulators to protect uninsured depositors and other creditors in a largefailing bank when such action is needed to prevent “serious effects on economic conditions or financialstability.”  This authority to protect uninsured claimants in a situation involving “systemic risk” is asignificant exception to FDICIA’s general rule, which bars the FDIC from making payments to uninsuredparties that would increase the cost of resolving a failed bank.  For a discussion of the TBTF doctrine andSection 141 of FDICIA, see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(1).  The collapse of First City in 1992 was the first failure of a bank larger than $1 billion in which theFDIC did not give full and immediate protection to all uninsured depositors.   See FED. DEPOSIT INS.CORP., MANAGING THE CRIS IS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE, 1980-94, at 577-80, 723-25 (Aug.1998).   No U.S. bank larger than $3 billion has failed since 1992, and federal regulators therefore do nothave a recent track record in applying the TBTF policy.  However, many analysts believe that regulatorswould protect uninsured depositors and payments system creditors if any of the 15 or 20 largest banks werethreatened with failure.  See, e.g., Ron J. Feldman & Arthur J. Rolnick, Fixing FDICIA: A Plan to Addressthe Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 12 Region No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Mar. 1998, at 2, 6-9; Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 997-1004; Rob Blackwell, As ‘Super Banks’ Grow, So DoAnalysts’ Fears, Am. Banker, Aug. 7, 2000, at 1.For evidence that consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has significantly increased thevulnerability of the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund, see, e.g., Robert Oshinsky, Effects of BankConsolidation on the Bank Insurance Fund, FDIC Working Paper No. 99-3 (available at <www.fdic.gov>),at 2, 12-18 (finding that (i) “the solvency of the [Bank Insurance Fund (“BIF”)] of today is inseparably tiedto the health of the largest banking organizations” (id. at 2); and (ii) the failure of any of the 10 largest U.S.banks would create a 12.5% chance of BIF insolvency); William M. Isaac, Financial Reform’s Unfinished20
bank size and greater risk.  Between 1972 and mid-1992, U.S. bank regulators protecteduninsured depositors and payments system creditors at every failed bank with assets of more than$1 billion.  Federal regulators applied the TBTF policy most prominently in protecting  uninsuredclaimants at Continental Illinois in 1984, First City and First RepublicBank in 1988, MCorp in1989, and Bank of New England in 1991.  Congress effectively codified the TBTF policy in 1991. As a consequence, the rapid consolidation of the U.S. banking industry over the past decade hassubstantially increased the risk that a major bank failure could bankrupt the FDIC’s depositinsurance fund.35  
Agenda, 14 Region No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Mar. 2000, at 34, 37 (stating concerns ofa former FDIC chairman about the agency’s ability to handle the failure of a giant banking organizationlike Citigroup, since “Citigroup, at nearly $800 billion in size, towers over the $29 billion FDIC fund”). 
36  For the impact of the TBTF doctrine in encouraging greater risk-taking by major U.S. banks,see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(4)(b)(iv),  I(E)(1) & (2) (discussing impact of theTBTF doctrine upon major U.S. banks); Feldman & Rolnick, supra note 35, at 6-9 (same); KAUFMAN , ONMONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 207-10, 226-30, 259-68, 278-86 (same) Edward J. Kane,Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?,32 J. Money, Credit & Banking 672 (2000) [hereinafter cited as Kane, Megamerger Incentives, at 673-74,691-94.  For recent studies documenting the implicit subsidy provided to big U.S. banks by the TBTFpolicy, see, e.g. , Craig H. Furfine, Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the OvernightFederal Funds Market, 74 J. Bus. 33, 36-40, 47 (2001) (finding that, during 1998, banks with more than$10 billion of assets paid significantly lower interest rates on overnight loans than those paid by smallerbanks); Hanweck & Shull, supra note 26, at 274-76 (showing that,  in 1997, big banks paid much lowerinterest rates on deposits and operated with substantially lower equity capital ratios, compared to smallerbanks); Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, Bond Market Discipline of Banks, in THE CHANGINGFINANCIAL INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND REGULATION, at 494, 504-06 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 36thAnn. Conf. on Bank Structure & Competition, 2000) (concluding that, during 1993-98, (i) public bondmarkets applied much less stringent discipline to banks with assets of more than $85 billion, and (ii)weaker bond market discipline was especially evident among the 11 big banks that were publicly identifiedas TBTF in 1984).A recent study found that the introduction of mandatory deposit insurance in the European Union(“EU”) in 1995 reduced risk-taking among most EU banks.  This risk-reduction effect occurred because, inseveral EU countries, de jure deposit insurance programs with limited coverage replaced earlier de factopolicies of protecting all bank creditors during financial crises.  The study concluded that the new EU21
Studies have shown that  the TBTF policy provides a significant implicit subsidy to thelargest  banks, because (i) it allows big banks to pay below-average interest rates to depositors andother creditors, and (ii) it leads shareholders and uninsured creditors to tolerate lower capitalratios and higher risk profiles at major banks.  The risk-taking behavior of big U.S. banks over thepast three decades indicates that they fully recognize and exploit their TBTF subsidy.  Once again,the relative ineffectiveness of market discipline over big U.S. banks is not a unique experience. For example, a recent study found a strong link between TBTF status and perverse risk incentivesamong large European banks.36
deposit insurance programs encouraged uninsured depositors and other creditors to monitor the safety andsoundness of most EU banks.  However, the study also determined that the new EU programs did notreduce risk-taking among banks classified as TBTF (a category including each bank that accounted formore than 12% of the banking assets in its country of incorporation).  Evidently, uninsured depositors andother creditors of major European banks continued to believe that they would receive full protection, andthey therefore did not effectively monitor risk-taking by major banks.  Reint Gropp & Jukka M. Vesala,Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Does the Counterfactual Matter?, European Central Bank WorkingPaper No. 47, July 2001 (available at <www.ecb.int./pub>), at 2-3, 8-12, 17-24.
37  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part III(C)(1) (describing the GLB Act’s“firewalls” and the practical difficulties inherent in enforcing those restrictions); id. Part III(B)(2)(discussing factors that have caused banks to support their nonbank affiliates); Anthony Cornyn et al.,  AnAnalysis of the Concept of Corporate Separateness in BHC Regulation from an Economic Perspective, inPROC EED INGS O F A CONF. ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 174, 185-93 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi.,IL, 1986) (describing situations in which banks decided to rescue their nonbank affiliates in order topreserve their reputations and avoid a loss of public confidence); Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving the SafetyNet: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 123, 227-31(1992) (same); Mark J. Flannery, Contagious Bank Runs, Financial Structure and Corporate Separatenesswithin a Bank Holding Company, in PROC EED INGS O F A CONF. ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION213 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Flannery, Corporate Separateness], at 217-23(describing the reputational concerns and fears of “contagion within a holding company” that providestrong incentives for bank holding companies to rescue their troubled nonbank subsidiaries).During his testimony at a congressional hearing in 1981, Walter Wriston (then chairman ofCiticorp) famously declared that “it  is inconceivable that any major bank would walk away from anysubsidiary of its holding company.  If your name is on the door, all of your capital funds are going to bebehind it in the real world.  Lawyers can say you have separation, but the marketplace is persuasive, and it22
2. Expansion of the Federal Safety NetMergers among banks, securities firms and insurance companies are likely to extend thescope of the TBTF subsidy to reach nonbank affiliates of large financial holding companies. Although the GLB Act mandates “firewalls” to separate bank subsidiaries from their nonbankaffiliates, those legal barriers are difficult to enforce and are likely to become highly permeable intimes of financial stress.  During an economic crisis – when investors and creditors are mostuncertain about  the soundness of financial intermediaries –  banks and other financial institutionshave a powerful reputational interest in supporting their troubled nonbank subsidiaries, regardlessof the formalities of corporate separation.37  
would not see it that way.”  Quoted in Cornyn et al., supra, at 191, 207 n.52.
38  See Flannery, Corporate Separateness, supra note ___,  at 214, 223-25; Mark J. Flannery,Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform,16 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 101 (1999) [hereinafter cited as Flannery,  Financial Regulation], at 103-09; Helen A.Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of RegulatoryReform, 49 Md. L. Rev. 314 (1990) [hereinafter cited as Garten, Subtle Hazards], at 346-51, 361-62, 366-67, 382; Anthony M. Santomero & David L. Eckles, The Determinants of Success in the New FinancialServices Environment, 6 Econ. Pol’y Rev. No. 4, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Oct. 2000, at 15, 18.For example, Citigroup recently decided to market all of its global corporate and investmentbanking services under the brand name of “Citigroup Corporate and Investment Bank.”  Citigroupexecutives declared that the new brand name would be “built around an aggressive, coordinated advertisingand communication plan” that would “bring further clarity to our identity in the marketplace and amongour clients.”  Paul Beckett, So Long, Poker Players: Salomon Is History, Wall St. J., May 23, 2001, at C18(quoting Michael Carpenter and Sanford Weill).  This unified branding strategy certainly increases thelikelihood that Citigroup will feel obliged to use the resources of its entire holding company to satisfyfuture liabilities created by its commercial banking and investment banking subsidiaries. 23
Moreover, in recent years major banks have deliberately increased their reputational stakein nonbank affiliates through market ing campaigns that promote unitary “brand names” coveringtheir ent ire holding companies.  The leading U.S. banking organizations have also coordinated theactivities of their banking and nonbanking subsidiaries by combining banking products withrelated nonbanking services (e.g., syndicated lending and securities underwriting).  As a result, theprofits, losses and risks of various units within a financial holding company are likely to be moreclosely correlated than a comparable group of independent firms.38   Accordingly, federal regulators will be inclined to prevent the failure of a nonbank affiliateof a major financial conglomerate, because of concerns that the affiliate’s default could trigger acontagious “run” by all of the conglomerate’s investors and creditors.  Under conditions ofwidespread economic distress – when financial firms are most vulnerable to a loss of publicconfidence – regulators would understandably fear that  the collapse of a large financial holdingcompany could trigger a systemic “flight to safety” in the financial markets.  During financial
39  See Thomas M. Hoenig, Financial Industry Megamergers and Policy Challenges, 84 Econ.Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of K.C., MO, 3d Qtr.  1999, at 7-8, 10-13 (speech by the Federal Reserve Bank ofKansas City’s president); KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra  note 34, at 207, 237-38; FredericS. Mishkin, Financial consolidation: Dangers and opportunities, 23 J. Banking & Fin. 675, 680-81 (1999);Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 15, 18-19 (speech co-authored by the Federal Reserve Bank ofPhiladelphia’s president); Gary H. Stern, Thoughts on Designing Credible Policies After FinancialModernization, 14 Region No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Sept.  2000, at 4-5, 24-25 (remarksby the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’ president); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, PartsI(D)(4)(b)(iv) & III(C)(3). 
40  See GRO UP O F TEN, REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, Jan. 2001(available at <www.bis.org>) [hereinafter cited as GRO UP O F TEN CONSOLIDATION REPORT], at 1 & n.1(stat ing that this report was prepared by staff members of the finance ministr ies and/or central bank staff ofAustra lia, Belgium, Canada,  France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,  Spain, Sweden Switzerland,the United Kingdom and the United States, along with representat ives of the Internat ional Monetary Fundand several other international organizations).  “Systemic risk” refers to the risk that (1) the collapse of oneor more financial firms will disrupt the financia l system by causing failures of other financia l institutions(either directly, through defaults on interbank obligations, or indirectly, through a generalized loss of publicconfidence that results in destabilizing “runs” on other financial institutions), and (2) the disruption of thefinancial system will impair the general economy by (a) cutting off credit flows to businesses andconsumers, and/or (B) causing a sharp depreciation in asset values that increases economic uncerta inty anddiscourages investment.  Id. at 126-27.     24
disruptions, federal regulators are likely to conclude that they must protect nonbank affiliates ofbig financial conglomerates in order to reduce the risk of a systemic crisis.39  In a recent report, financial regulators from the “Group of Ten” developed nationsrecognized the strong possibility that large financial conglomerates do create greater “systemicrisk” (viz., the risk that the failure of a major financial institution will severely disrupt the financialsystem and have adverse “spillover” effects on the general economy).40  The report pointed to theemergence in the United States of “large complex banking organizations” (“LCBOs”), whichengage in a wide range of banking and nonbanking activities and are managed on a highlyintegrated and centralized basis.  The growing consolidation of financial assets within LCBOs has(i) increased the complexity of major financial institutions, making it harder for regulators andmarket participants to comprehend in a timely manner the risks inherent in LCBOs, (ii) produced
41  See id. at 132-46.  See also Gianni De Nicolo & Myron L. Kwast, Systemic Risk and FinancialConsolidation: Are They Related?, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser.Working Paper 2001-33, June 19, 2001 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov>) (concluding that therapidly growing market share held by LCBOs in the U.S.  banking industry during 1988-99 probablyincreased systemic risk, because of closer financial linkages and higher risk correlations among LCBOs);Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(D)(4)(b)(iv) (discussing the FDIC’s authority, under 12U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G), to protect uninsured creditors of a bank whose failure could create systemic risk).
42  Christopher T. Mahoney, Commentary, 6 Econ. Pol’y Rev. No. 4, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Oct.2000, at 55,  57-58.   Federal regulators frequently disclaim any intent to follow a TBTF policy in dealingwith the possible failure of a major financial institution.  See Kenneth H. Thomas, Fed’s ‘Too Big to Fail’Stance Curious in the Megabank Era, Am. Banker, July 27, 2001, at 9 (noting statements by FRBchairman Alan Greenspan and vice chairman Roger Ferguson).  Nevertheless, Alan Blinder, a former FRBvice chairman, has candidly acknowledged that “[e]verybody knows that there are institutions that are solarge and so interlinked with others that it is out of the question to let them fail.”  Id. 25
a higher concentration and correlation of credit and market risks among the largest financialinstitutions, due to their growing domination of the markets for interbank loans, OTC derivativesand investment banking services, and (iii) produced close linkages between banking andnonbanking subsidiaries of financial holding companies, thereby complicating the problem ofresolving the failure of a major bank in isolation from its closely linked nonbank affiliates.  Thereport noted that regulators facing the potential failure of an LCBO might well deem it necessaryto invoke the “systemic risk” authority that permits the FDIC to protect uninsured creditors of alarge failing bank.41    Similarly, a senior official at Moody’s Investors Services, one of the two largest securitiesrating agencies, has declared that the threat of “financial panic” should cause federal regulators tosupport big financial conglomerates during “times of extreme financial stress.”  In his view, theTBTF status of major financial holding companies is undeniable – it is “like the elephant at thepicnic – everyone is aware of it, but no one wants to mention it.”42  In sum, the growth of big financial holding companies increases the likelihood that major
43  The federal “safety net” for banks consists of deposit insurance, protection of uninsureddepositors and creditors of big banks under the TBTF policy, discount window advances provided by theFRB as LOLR, and the FRB’s guarantee of interbank payments made on Fedwire.  Many  regulators andanalysts have concluded that  (i) the federal safety net provides a valuable net subsidy to banks (i.e., thesafety net confers benefits that exceed the costs of complying with federal bank regulations), and (ii) thissubsidy grows much larger in times of financial crisis.  The existence of a long-term net subsidy issupported by data showing that financial markets permit banks (especially the largest banks that arepresumptively TBTF) to (A) pay interest rates on deposits that are substantially lower than market ratespaid by nonbank companies on short-term, uninsured debt, and (B) operate with capital ratios that aresignificantly lower than those held by competing financial intermediaries, such as commercial andconsumer finance companies and life insurers.  The value of the federal subsidy is also indicated by the factthat no major bank has ever surrendered its charter and chosen to operate as a nonbank.  See Allen N.Berger, Richard J.  Herring & Giorgio P. Szegö, The role of capital in financial institutions, 19 J. Banking& Fin. 393, 400-06 (1995); Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in Banking: The Link to FinancialModernization, FRBSF Econ. Letter No. 97-31, Fed. Res. Bank of S.F., CA, Oct. 24, 1997; KAUFMAN ,ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 239-40; Myron L. Kwast & S.  Wayne Passmore, TheSubsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory and Evidence, 16 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 35 passim (1999);John R.  Walter, Can a Safety Net Be Contained?, 84 Econ. Q. No. 1, Fed.  Res. Bank of Rich., VA, Winter1998, at 1, 2-11.  See also Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Debunking Debanking: Idea Sounds Interesting ButExamine the Costs, Am. Banker, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1, 4 (explaining that a bank which surrendered itscharter would lose significant benefits, because (i) an institution without access to the Federal Reserve’spayments system would lose “[t]he ability to quickly and efficiently move large amounts of money,” and(ii) an institution without deposit insurance would “[pay] more to attract funds . . . [and] would risk losingcustomers looking for safety”).   For a contrasting perspective, questioning whether the federal safety net provides benefits to banksthat are greater  than the accompanying costs of regulation, see, e.g., Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, TheFederal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BankingRev. No. 1, at 1, 2-12 (1999) (agreeing that the federal safety net provides a gross subsidy to banks, butarguing that any net subsidy is small in view of the costs of bank regulation).  
44  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(1) & I(E)(2) (b)(iii)(D) (reviewing thecosts of resolving bank and thrift failures during 1980-94).26
segments of the securities and life insurance industries will be brought within the scope of theTBTF doctrine, thereby expanding the scope and cost of federal “safety net” guarantees.43  Thisde facto extension of the federal safety net is likely to be very costly during future financial crises. For example, during 1980-94, U.S. taxpayers and deposit insurance funds paid out almost $200billion to resolve the failures of 3,000 banks and thrift institutions.44  The United States has hardly been alone in encountering financial disruptions during the
45  See, e.g., Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler,  Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility, 84 Econ.Rev. No. 4, Fed. Res. Bank of K.C., MO, 4th Qtr. 1999, at 17, 17-21; Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco,A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, 116 Q. J. Econ. 489 passim (2001); Richard J. Herring& Anthony M. Santomero, What Is Optimal Financial Regulation?,  in NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE,supra note 28, at 51,  60; George G.  Kaufman,  Banking and currency crises and systemic risk: Lessonsfrom recent events, 24 Econ. Perspectives No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 3d Qtr. 2000, at 9 [hereinaftercited as Kaufman, Banking Crises], at 9-20; KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 59-60, 223-46; Michael Moskow, Disruptions in global financial markets: The role of public policy, 24 Econ.Perspectives No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 3d Qtr. 2000, at 2, 2-5.27
past two decades.  More than 130 countries experienced serious banking problems during 1980-95, while East Asia and Russia suffered devastating financial crises during 1997-98.  Many ofthese recent  financial crises occurred after governments deregulated their financial sectors andfailed to exercise adequate supervisory oversight, while continuing to provide explicit  or implicitguarantees for bank liabilities.  The resulting moral hazard encouraged excessive risk-taking,leading to “boom-and-bust cycles” that ultimately destroyed the solvency of major financialinstitutions.  In addition, most financial crises resulted in costly expenditures of government fundsto recapitalize or liquidate failing banks.  The United States spent almost 3% of its gross domesticproduct (“GDP”) in resolving its thrift crisis, while other countries have suffered losses rangingfrom 10-40% of GDP as a result of financial disruptions.45  Thus, the past two decades provide compelling evidence of the dangers inherent inliberalizing the powers of financial institutions without taking adequate steps to remove the moralhazard problems that encourage excessive risk-taking.  Recently, Citigroup and Merrill Lynchhave demonstrated the ability of large financial conglomerates to exploit the subsidy provided byfederal deposit insurance.  During 2000, both companies established “sweep” programs enablingcustomers to switch funds from their uninsured securities brokerage accounts into FDIC-insureddeposit accounts at affiliated banks.  By April 2001, brokerage customers of Merrill Lynch and
46  Richard Melville, Deposit Power: Where Merrill, B of A, Citi Agree, Am. Banker, Dec. 18,2000, at 1 (quoting James Wiggins of Merrill Lynch, and also reporting that Citigroup was expected to useits deposit sweep program to generate low-cost financing for the consumer lending business of its newly-acquired subsidiary, Associates First Capital).  See also Charles Gasparino, Fund Track: Merrill Lynch’sSmall Investors Face Rate Cut, Wall St. J., April 30, 2001, at C1 (stating that, unlike assets held in itsmoney market mutual funds, Merrill Lynch “can legally lend out its bank deposits, and pocket the interest-rate spread between what it pays on the deposits and what it charges investors”); Rob Blackwell, Merrill,Solly Put $28B Into Insured Accounts, Am. Banker, April 19, 2001,  at 1 [hereinafter Blackwell, DepositSweeps] (reporting that, as of Mar. 31, 2001, Merrill Lynch’s sweep program had created nearly $60billion in new FDIC-insured bank deposits and Citigroup’s program had created $17 billion of suchdeposits).    
47  See Gasparino, supra note 46; Blackwell, Deposit Sweeps, supra note 46; Wilmarth,Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(C) (explaining that, since 1996, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act28
Citigroup had used these “sweep” programs to  transfer over $75 billion into insured depositaccounts.  Both companies indicated that their new FDIC-insured deposits would be used, in part,to provide funding for the activities of their nonbank subsidiaries.   For example, when aspokesman for Merrill Lynch was asked what his company would do with its “newfound low-costfunds,” he replied that the company’s deposits would give it “flexibility . . . to finance other partsof our business.”46  The Citigroup and Merrill Lynch sweep programs also reveal how current banking lawspermit large financial conglomerates with multiple bank subsidiaries to expand the level of depositinsurance offered to each customer.  Merrill Lynch’s brokerage customers can obtain up to$200,000 of deposit insurance coverage by making structured transfers to two affiliated banks,while Citigroup’s brokerage customers can secure up to $600,000 of deposit insurance coverageby making similar transfers to six affiliated banks.  Because the banks owned by Merrill Lynch andCitigroup are “well managed” and “well capitalized” under current regulatory standards, bothcompanies receive free deposit insurance for the consumer deposits created by their sweepprograms.47  Other financial holding companies are likely to establish similar programs, because
(“FDI Act”) has effectively prevented the FDIC from charging any deposit insurance premiums to “wellcapitalized” and  “well managed” banks, which account for more than 90% of all U.S. banks).
48  See Steven Pearls tein & Peter Pae, Megabank Day, Wash. Post, April 19, 1998, at H1 (citingBank One chairman John McCoy’s view that “access to consumer deposits . . .  amounted to cheap capital”for big banks); Matthias Rieker, Banks Seen Missing The Boat by Failing to Generate Deposits, Am.Banker, Apr il 5, 2001, at 2 (reporting that,  according to James McCormick of First Manhattan ConsultingGroup,  consumer deposit accounts produced 51% of total U.S. bank revenues and 66% of total U.S.  bankpretax profits in 1999).
49  See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 37, at 226-30; Garten, Subtle Hazards, supra note 38, at 353-64,376-81; Jones & Kolatch, supra note 43, at 12-14; Kane, Megamerger Incentives, supra note 36, at 689-94; Walter, supra note 43, at 10-13; GAO Says Banks May Pass Net Subsidy To Their Affiliates, 16Banking Pol’y Rep. No. 18, Sept. 15, 1997, at 7 [hereinafter cited as GAO Bank Subsidy Report], at 8-9(reprinting excerpts of letter from GAO Chief Economist James Bothwell to Rep. Richard Baker).  See alsoinfra Part II(A)(1) (discussing ways in which banks can shift their federal subsidy to affiliates despite theexistence of regulatory firewalls); Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 18-19 (concluding that “universalbanking does present a new way in which government-induced moral hazard can manifest itself .  . . [and]can be passed down to nonbank subsidiaries owned by universal banks”).29
financial executives and analysts  recognize the significant funding advantage provided to banksby their ability to collect low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits.48  Financial holding companies will thus have both opportunities and incentives to use theirbanking subsidiaries’ access to the federal safety net to  provide cross-subsidies to their nonbankaffiliates.  Many analysts have concluded that (i) banks have incentives to transfer a portion oftheir safety net subsidies to nonbank affiliates, and (ii) while current federal regulations attempt toinhibit such transfers, they cannot prevent them entirely.  Transfers of safety net subsidies willinhibit market discipline and encourage greater risk-taking among financial holding companies. Indeed, the risk-enhancing effects of cross-subsidization are likely to offset any risk reductioncreated by diversification as banks combine with securities firms and life insurance companies.493. Greater Consolidation of Risk within the Financial Services Industry Perhaps the greatest danger of the movement toward financial conglomeration is that it
50  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(A)(2)(b), I(E)(2)(b)(iii)(G), and III(B);Remarks by FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the World Bank Group and the IMF Program ofSeminars, Sept. 27, 1999 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited as 1999 GreenspanIMF Speech], at 1-3.
51  See Kaufman, Banking Architecture, supra note 28, at 44; Wilmarth, Transformation, supranote 12, Part III(B). 30
will increase the concentration of credit risk and market risk within the U.S. financial system.  Byauthorizing unlimited combinations between banks and nonbank financial firms, the GLB Act haslargely removed the alternative financing channels that the U.S. financial system contained – andthat acted as “shock absorbers” for the U.S. economy – prior to 1999.  For example, the FRBmobilized leading U.S. banks to counteract  serious disruptions in the capital markets during thePenn Central commercial paper crisis of 1970, the Hunt Brothers silver crisis of 1980, the stockmarket crash of 1987 and the Russian debt crisis of 1998.  In each case, major banks providedemergency credit that enabled large nonbank firms to avoid bankruptcy or severe distress.  Bankswere able to serve as standby sources of liquidity and credit on each occasion, because theircapital markets activities represented a relatively small portion of their overall operations and didnot expose them to devastating losses.  Conversely, the securities industry provided financing thathelped to revive the U.S. economy after the recession and banking crisis of 1990-91, becausesecurities firms were not crippled by the LDC and real estate lending problems that afflicted majorbanks at that time.50  In sum, the legal barriers separating banks and securities firms prior to 1999reduced systemic risk in the U.S. economy by (i) insulating each sector to a substantial degreefrom the other’s problems, and (ii) allowing each sector to act as an alternative source offinancing while the other recovered from serious financial losses.51In contrast, consider the record of Japan during the 1990's.  In 1990, the Japanese banking
52  For discussions of the collapse of the Japanese real estate and stock markets since 1990, and theresulting impact on the Japanese economy and financial system, see, e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale,Bubbles and Crises, 110 Econ. J.  236, 236-38, 252-54 (2000) Valentine V. Craig, Japanese Banking: ATime of Crisis, 11 FDIC Banking Rev. No. 2, at 9, 12-17 (1998); Curtis J . Milhaupt, Japan’s Experiencewith Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: Implications for Financial Regulatory Design?, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 399, 413-24 (1999); Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Japanese Banking Problems: Implications forLending in the United States, New Eng. Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, MA, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 25[hereinafter cited as Peek and Rosengren, Japanese Banking Problems], at 25-31; Wilmarth,  Big BankMergers, supra note 26, at 62-69.  By the end of 2000, the Japanese government had spent more than $1 trillion in its efforts tostimulate the economy (primar ily through public works projects and temporary tax cuts).  See Bill Spindle,Japan’s Massive Debt Bomb Ticks Ever Louder, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at A27.  In addition, thegovernment had spent more than $200 billion,  and had budgeted an additional $350 billion, to protect bank31
system had massive exposures to both the real estate market and the stock market.   Japanesebanks made huge amounts of  loans secured by real estate and securit ies, and they also heldextensive portfolios of corporate stocks, due primarily to cross-shareholding relationships withintheir respective corporate groups (keiretsu).  Beginning in 1990, the Japanese real estate andstock markets both collapsed, with prices in each sector falling by two-thirds or more.  Due tostaggering losses caused by bad loans and falling stock values, two of the twenty largest Japanesebanks failed and several other big banks were driven to the brink of insolvency.  Two majorsecurit ies firms and three large insurance companies also failed.  After a decade of hugelyexpensive programs, the Japanese government has not yet  succeeded in its efforts to stimulate theeconomy and restore the financial system.  The Japanese economy has remained stuck in aprolonged slump, due in large part to the inability of banks to provide credit needed by Japanesebusiness firms.  Banks are still severely weakened by nonperforming loans and depreciated stocks,and the securities markets have not sustained any prolonged rally.  By the autumn of 2001, Japanfaced a floundering economy and a fragile banking system, along with record debt levels thatmade it extremely difficult for the Japanese government to finance new assistance programs.52 
depositors and recapitalize the banking system.  Finally, the government had spent further billions ofdollars in “price-keeping operations” designed to support the stock market. See Craig, supra, at 50;Milhaupt, supra, at 421-24; Phred Dvorak & Peter Landers, Is Japan on the Verge of a ContagiousFinancial Crisis?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at A14 (“Financial Safety Net” tbl.).  For descriptions of the grave fiscal and economic problems and the unresolved banking crisis thatconfronted Japan in 2001, see, e.g. , Ken Belson, Japan: This Time, It Could Get Nasty, Bus. Week, Jan.15, 2001, at 52 (stating that the Japanese government would be “hard-pressed” to finance additionalstimulus programs for its struggling economy, because Japan’s national debt had already reached $5.8trillion, or 141% of its gross domestic product, amounting to “the industrialized world’s largest fiscaldeficit”); Japan’s Economy: Another false dawn?, Economist, Mar. 24, 2001, at 79, 80-81 (reporting that(i) Japanese banks had written off about $600 billion of nonperforming loans during the prior decade, butthey still held that much or more in bad loans on their balance sheets, because “good loans [were] souringas fast as banks can provision against them or write them off,” and (ii) while Japanese banks hadpreviously relied on unrealized gains in their “huge equity portfolios” to offset their loan charge-offs, thosestock portfolios had become “full of losses” as the Japanese stock market “hover[ed] near a 16-year low”);Phred Dvorak, Corporate Bankruptcies in Japan Hit Record High, Wall St. J., April 16, 2001, at A12(reporting that Japanese corporations with over $200 billion in unpaid liabilities had declared bankruptcyduring the previous year);  Japan’s economy: Chronic sickness, Economist, June 2, 2001, at 71,71 (statingthat Japan’s economy had posted “the worst ten-year performance of any big economy in the past half-century”); Japan’s banks: Out for the count, Economist, Oct. 11, 2001 (reporting that Japan appeared to beon the brink of a major banking crisis, because a “deepening recession” had caused “bad loans . . . to soar”along with “plunging share prices” that were eroding the capital of Japanese banks).
53  See, e.g., Craig, supra note 50, at 14-17; Milhaupt, supra note 50, at 408-24; Michael Williamset al., Day of Reckoning: Wall Street Intensifies Japan’s Woes,  but They All Trace Back to Home, WallSt.  J.,  Mar. 16, 2001, at A1.  In June 2001, a new Japanese government, under the leadership of PrimeMinister Junichiro Koizumi, issued a preliminary outline of structural reforms intended to address Japan’slongstanding economic and financial problems.  However, analysts questioned whether Mr. Koizumi (i)could overcome well-entrenched opponents of reform among Japan’s business leaders, politicians andbureaucrats, and (ii) would retain his political popularity if his reforms, as expected, caused sharpincreases in unemployment and corporate bankruptcies.   See, e.g., Brian Bremner, Will Koizumi’s ReformsBe as Tough as His Talk?, Bus. Week, Aug. 6, 2001, at 45; Clay Chandler, Tokyo Unveils ReformStrategy, Wash. Post, June 22, 2001, at E1; Neil A. Martin, Will Japan’s Koizumi Soon Be Ex-PrimeMinister?, Barron’s, Sept. 10, 2001, at MW10. 32
    Many observers have blamed Japan’s failure to resolve its banking and economicproblems on the unwillingness of its political and business leaders to push for a fundamentalrestructuring of Japan’s financial system and general economy.53  Resistance to changeundoubtedly accounts for a major part of Japan’s continuing difficulties.  However, the role ofJapanese banks as dominant providers of business finance, and their exposure to both credit risk in
54  See Craig,  supra  note 50, at  9-14; 1999 Greenspan IMF Speech, supra note 48, at 2; Peek &Rosengren, Japanese Banking Problems, supra note 50, at 26-31; Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note26, at 62-63, 69 n.319.
55  See supra note 38 and accompanying text; Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervisionof Large Complex Banking Organizations, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 47, 51-53 (2001); Santomero & Eckles,supra note 38, at 15,  18; U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., Risk-Focused Bank Examinations: Regulators ofLarge Banking Organizations Face Challenges, GAO/GGD-00-48, Jan. 2000 [hereinafter cited as GAOLCBO Study], at 5, 15, 24, 28-30.  33
the real estate market and investment risk in the securities markets, help to explain the severityand protracted nature of the Japanese crisis.  The Japanese financial system concentrated businessfinancing, credit risk and investment risk within its major banks.  As a result, the simultaneouscollapse of Japan’s real estate and stock markets crippled the banks and left no substantialalternative source of financing for Japanese businesses.54  The Japanese experience provides a warning signal about the systemic risk implications ofuniversal banking.  Based on merger patterns among domestic and foreign financial institutionssince 1990, the GLB Act could spur a consolidation of much of the U.S. banking, securities andlife insurance industries into a small group of big universal banks.  In addition, as noted above,most financial conglomerates are centrally managed and coordinate the activities of their nonbanksubsidiaries with core operations of their lead banks (e.g., by combining securities underwritingwith syndicated lending for the same corporate clients).  The financial markets and bankregulators therefore view these conglomerates as highly integrated enterprises, despite the GLBAct’s mandates for corporate veils and regulatory firewalls between their various subsidiaries.55  Thus, the trend toward cross-indust ry consolidation will increase the concentration andpotential correlation of credit risk and market risk in the U.S. financial system.  As a result, (i)widespread defaults on bank loans or OTC derivatives will have undermine investor confidence in
56  See Hoenig,  supra note 39, at 10-13; Remarks by FRB Governor Laurence H. Meyer before aNat’l Bur. of Econ. Res. Conf., Jan. 14, 2000 (<available at www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter citedas 2000 Meyer NBER Speech], at 1-2; Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 15-16, 18-20; Stern, supranote 39, at 4-5, 24-26.  See also Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 986-1004 (contending thatlarge bank mergers create joint failure risks and increase the likelihood of TBTF bailouts).
57  See S. Rep. No. 44, supra note 21, at 7-8; H.R. Rep. No. 74, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 133-35(1999); MCCOY, supra note 3, § 6.05; O’Neal, supra note 2, at 100-12.    
58  For a discussion of the GLB Act’s provisions, see H.R. Rep. No. 434, 106th Cong., 1st. Sess.155, 159-60 (1999) (Conf. Rep.); O’Neal, supra note 2,  at 104-05, 108, 112 (same).  For a discussion ofFDICIA’s “prompt corrective action” program for undercapitalized banks,  see, e.g., George J. Benston &George G. Kaufman, FDICIA After Five Years,  11 J. Econ. Perspectives 139, 144-49 (1997); U.S. Gen.Accounting Off. , Bank and Thrift Regulation: Implementation of FDICIA’s Prompt Regulatory ActionProvisions, GAO/GGD-97-18, Nov. 1996 [hereinafter cited as GAO PCA Study], at 14-21, 25-27.  34
securities firms that are affiliated with banks, and (ii) stock market crashes will have directspillover effects on banks that are affiliated with securities firms.  In short, the growth of largefinancial holding companies will probably increase the risks of contagion within the financialsystem, thereby intensifying pressures for TBTF bailouts during financial disruptions.56 II. Current Regulatory Efforts Are Inadequate to Control the Risk-Taking Incentivesof Financial ConglomeratesThe current federal supervisory regime attempts to control the risks of LCBOs bypursuing a four-pronged strategy.  First, the GLB Act requires financial holding companies toconduct securities, insurance and merchant banking activities in nonbank subsidiaries that areseparately incorporated, separately capitalized and insulated by regulatory “firewalls” from theiraffiliated banks.57  Second, the GLB Act declares that all banks in a financial holding companymust be “well capitalized,” and FDICIA mandates a regime of “prompt corrective act ion”(“PCA”) for any bank that fails to meet prescribed capital standards.58  Third, the GLB Actrequires all banks in a financial holding company to be “well managed,” and the FRB and OCChave instituted new supervisory procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of each LCBO’s
59  See H.R. Rep. No. 434, supra note 58, at 155, 159-60 (discussing the GLB Act’s “wellmanaged” requirement); O’Neal, supra note 2, at 104-05, 108, 112 (same).  For descriptions of the FRB’sand OCC’s new supervisory procedures for LCBOs, see generally DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 55;2000 Meyer NBER Speech, supra note 56; Remarks by Governor  Laurence H. Meyer at the Int’l BankingConf. of the Fed. Fin. Institutions Examination Council, May 31, 2000 (available at<www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited as 2000 Meyer FFIEC Speech]; GAO LCBO Study, supranote 55. 
60  See O’Neal, supra note 2, at 109 (explaining provision of GLB Act requiring a national bank tohave at least one issue of outstanding debt securities rated in one of the top three rating categories by anational recognized rating agency if the bank wishes to establish a financial subsidiary and is one of the 50largest U.S. banks).  See also Meyer , NBER Speech, supra note 54, at 2-6 (arguing for measuresencouraging greater market discipline over LCBOs; Meyer FFIEC Speech, supra note 59, at 3-4 (same).
61  See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Overview of The New Basel Capital Accord, Jan.2001 (available at <www.bis.org>) [hereinafter cited as 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview], at 1,7,12-36.  See also 2000 Meyer NBER Speech, supra note 56, at 2-3 (explaining that federal bank regulatorswere already implementing supervisory policies that were consistent with the “three pillars” of the BaselCommittee’s new capital adequacy proposal, as originally set forth in a 1999 concept paper).In June 2001, responding to widespread criticism of its January proposal, the Basel Committeeextended its timetable for adopting and implementing its new capital accord.  However,  the Committeestressed that “it  remains strongly committed to the three pillars architecture of the new Accord and to thebroad objective of improving the risk sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements.”  Basel Comm. onBank Supervision, Update on the New Basel Capital Accord, 25 June 2001 (available at <www.bis.org>)[hereinafter cited as June 2001 Basel Update].  See also Richard Cowden & Daniel Pruzin, Basel PanelExtends Proposal Time Line, Taking Pressure Off Consultation Process, 77 BNA’s Banking Rep. 3335
management.59  Fourth, Congress and regulators are taking steps to encourage greater marketdiscipline of LCBOs.  For example, the GLB Act requires major banks to issue investment-gradedebt securities if they wish to establish direct financial subsidiaries.60  This regulatory philosophy is consistent with a new capital adequacy proposal issued inJanuary 2001 by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision.  The Basel Committee’s 2001proposal recommends a new regulatory framework based on “three pillars” – minimum capitalrequirements, enhanced supervisory review procedures and market discipline.  As indicatedabove, these “three pillars” reflect  policies that are already being implemented by U.S. bankregulators for LCBOs.61  Regarding the first “pillar” of capital requirements, the Basel
(2001). 
62  Under the Basel Committee’s proposal, only large, sophisticated banks that establishsatisfactory internal risk management systems would be permitted to use internal risk ratings to calculatetheir capital requirements.  Smaller banks would continue to comply with uniform, standardized capitalrules established by the Basel Committee.  See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 1-2, 7-8, 11-17; 2000 Meyer NBER Speech, supra note 56, at 1-3.  See also H.R. Rep. No. 434, supra note58, at 157-59 (explaining that the GLB Act authorizes the FRB, as “umbrella supervisor,” to establishconsolidated capital requirements for financial holding companies and their subsidiaries, although the FRBmay not change the separate capital rules established by primary regulators for “functionally regulated”subsidiaries, such as banks, securities firms and insurance companies). 36
Committee’s new proposal incorporates two new approaches that have been pursued by U.S.bank regulators: (i) applying capital requirements on a consolidated basis to the entire financialholding company (including nonbank subsidiaries), and (ii) establishing capital requirements foreach LCBO in accordance with internal risk ratings that have been developed by the LCBO’smanagers and reviewed by bank regulators.62Unfortunately, as discussed below, all four elements of the present U.S. supervisoryprogram for LCBOs have exhibited serious shortcomings in the past.  Accordingly, currentregulatory approaches are unlikely to prevent financial conglomerates from engaging in excessiverisk-taking at the expense of the federal safety net.A. The Ineffectiveness of Corporate Separation as a Risk Control DeviceSupervisory requirements based on the concept of corporate separation are in fundamentalconflict with the actual behavior of financial holding companies.  Most LCBOs operate as unitaryenterprises, based on centralized capital allocation and risk management policies that disregardformal structural divisions between corporate subsidiaries.  On many occasions, financial holdingcompanies have rescued nonbank affiliates or their customers in order to protect the reputations
63  See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, PartsIII(B) & III(C)(1).
64  See, e.g., Cornyn et al.,  supra note 37, at 186 (describing how Hamilton National Bank failed inthe mid-1970's after its parent holding company forced the bank, in violation of legal restrictions onaffiliate transactions, to purchase large amounts of low-quality mortgages from its troubled mortgagebanking affiliate); Garten, Subtle Hazards, supra note 38, at 353-54 (same, and noting that ContinentalBank ignored legal lending limits by extending credit to rescue its options trading subsidiary during theOctober 1987 stock market crash); William S. Haraf,  The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Lessonsfor the Bank Regulators, Regulation (Cato Rev. of Bus. & Gov’t), Winter 1991, at 22, 23 (stating that,when Drexel Burnham was threatened with failure in early 1990, it  withdrew capital from its regulatedsecurities subsidiaries in excess of regulatory limits until the SEC intervened to prevent further capitaltransfers).
65  See H.R. Rep. No. 74, supra note 57, at 134-35; Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates: Notice of proposed rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,186(2001) [hereinafter cited as FRB Proposed Affiliate Transaction Rule], at 24,186.  Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act prohibits an FDIC-insured bank from engaging in “covered transact ions” with nonbank affiliates (e.g., extensions of credit to affiliates or purchases ofsecurities or assets from affiliates) in an amount greater than (i) 10% of the bank’s capital stock andsurplus for any single affiliate, or (ii) 20% of its capital stock and surplus for all affilia tes.  In addition,extensions of credit to affiliates must be secured by qualifying collateral.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c &1828(j)(1); FRB Proposed Affiliate Transaction Rule, supra, at 24,186-87.  Section 23B generally requires that any transaction between an FDIC-insured bank and a nonbankaffiliate must be conducted on terms (including credit standards) comparable to arm’s length transactionswith non-affiliated companies.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c-1 & 1828(j)(1); FRB Proposed AffiliateTransaction Rule, supra, at 24,187. 37
of the parent holding company and its regulated financial institutions.63  In the most serious cases,holding company managers have deliberately violated regulatory firewalls by exceeding the legallimits on financial support that banks or other regulated financial institution may provide totroubled affiliates.64  The GLB Act relies on Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to preventabusive transactions between banks and their nonbank affiliates within the new financial holdingcompany structure.65  However, regulators and analysts have acknowledged that (i) therestrictions mandated by Sections 23A and 23B are complicated and difficult to enforce, and (ii) 
66  For discussions of the difficulties regulators face in enforcing limitations on affiliatetransactions, see Fisher, supra note 37, at 229-30; Garten, Subtle Hazards, supra note 38, at 380-81(sta ting that the “[FRB] has admitted that restrictions on interaffiliate funds transfers frequently have beenviolated or interpreted creatively by management in times of stress”); GAO Bank Subsidy Report, supranote 47, at 8-9.  See also infra  note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s reported waiver ofSection 23A during September 2001).  In May 2001, the FRB issued proposed and final rules under Sections 23A and 23B that reveal thescope and complexity of legal and operational issues arising under those statutes.  The FRB’s proposedrule, which would incorporate most of the interpretations that the FRB has previously issued under thosestatutes, covers more than 30 pages in the Federal Register.   See FRB Proposed Affiliate Transaction Rule,supra note 65.  The FRB’s final rules, which contain new interpretations of the two statutes, occupy morethan a dozen additional pages. See 64 Fed. Reg. 24,220-33 (2001).38
managerial evasions of those provisions are often subtle and hard to detect.   As a result, when afinancial holding company or some of its subsidiaries are under severe financial stress, regulatorsmay fail to discover and prevent a transfer of bank funds or bank credit that violates regulatorylimits.  Moreover, to avert a systemic financial crisis, regulators may decide to waive Section 23Aand 23B so that major banks can help their troubled affiliates.  For example, in September 2001,regulators reportedly suspended Section 23A and encouraged leading banks to transfer funds tosecurities affiliates to head off a threatened liquidity crunch following the terrorist at tack on theWorld Trade Center.66Thus, federal bank regulators currently appear to give little weight to the concept ofcorporate separation as an effective risk control device.  Regulators understand that large financialholding companies operate in accordance with centralized business strategies and riskmanagement systems that transcend corporate boundaries between affiliates.  Regulators thereforeare now stressing the importance of supervising financial holding companies in a consolidatedmanner that cuts across corporate divisions among banks subsidiaries and their nonbank
67  See, e.g., DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 55, at 51-53; GAO LCBO Study, supra note 55, at 5,7, 14-18, 24-30; Meyer FFIEC Speech, supra note 59, at 5-8.
68  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 44, supra note 21, at 7 (concluding that the holding company structurewould ensure that the FDIC’s deposit insurance funds were “adequately insulated from paying the losses offirms which are affiliated with insured banks”); H.R. Rep.  No. 74, supra  note 57, at  99-102 (citingstatements by federal regula tors and industry representat ives claiming that corporate separation andregulatory “firewalls” would insulate FDIC-insured banks from the potential risks of their nonbankaffiliates).  See also Flannery, Financial Regulation, supra  note 38, at  112 n.10 (stating that “manyproponents of broad financial conglomerate powers insist that legal separateness will effectively insulatebanking activities, without explicitly addressing the question of de facto integration.  This omission isparticularly noteworthy when it is accompanied by an assertion that  regulation should permitconglomerates to take maximum advantage of scope economies among the various product lines – whichseems to contradict the promise of de facto separateness!”). 
69  Between 1984 and 1989, the off-balance-sheet activities of banks increased from 55% of on-balance-sheet assets to 164% of such assets.  This rapid growth of off-balance-sheet commitments“effectively decreased capital” at many banks.  U.S.  Gen. Accounting Off., Deposit Insurance: A Strategyfor Reform, GAO/GGD-91-26, Mar. 1991 [hereinafter GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study], at 84-85. See also Berger, Herring & Szegö, supra note 43, at 419-20.  39
affiliates.67  Given the banking agencies’ current adherence to the concept of consolidatedsupervision, I now wonder whether regulators and lobbyists for the financial services industryactually believed in the virtues of corporate separation during the 1990's, or whether they simplyused the “firewall” argument to help persuade Congress to enact the GLB Act.68 B. Shortcomings in Capital RegulationFederal regulators first adopted across-the-board capital rules for banks in 1981-83. Those rules imposed fixed leverage requirements based on balance sheet assets but did notaccount for off-balance-sheet obligations (e.g., standby letters of credit, loan commitments andderivatives) held by banks.  As a result, many banks reduced their effective regulatory capitalrequirements by shifting from traditional lending to the issuance of off-balance-sheet commitmentsthat often carried equal or greater credit risks.69  During 1989-92, federal regulators implemented the international risk-based capital accord
70  See Berger, Herring & Szegö, supra  note 43, at  414-15; GAO Deposit  Insurance Reform Study,supra note 69, at 85-88.
71  See Robert C. Merton, Financial innovation and the management and regulation of financialinstitutions, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 461, 468-70 (1995) (showing how a bank could greatly reduce itseffective capital requirements under the 1988 Accord by using derivatives in place of conventional financialinstruments); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(2)(e)(iv) (explaining how large bankshave used securitization techniques to engage in “capital arbitrage” that significantly reduces their capitalrequirements under the 1988 Accord).  See also U.S. Gen. Accounting Off.,  Risk-Based Capital:Regulatory and Industry Approaches to Capital and Risk, GAO/GGD-98-153, July 1998 [hereinafter citedas GAO Risk-Based Capital Study], at 68, 169 (reporting that, in discussions with representatives of sixmajor banks, “[o]fficials of two banks commented that they are not constrained by regulatory capitalrequirements, because assets can always be securitized so capital will not have to be held against them, orthey can move to riskier assets in each credit risk category to obtain higher returns”). 40
promulgated by the Basel Committee in 1988 (the “1988 Accord”).  The 1988 Accord establishesminimum capital requirements for banks by assigning various types of loans and off-balance-sheetcommitments to four risk-weighted categories based on perceived credit risks. The 1988 Accordhas thus removed the prior regulatory incentive for off-balance-sheet commitments, but its fourrisk-weighted categories are too broad and imprecise to distinguish among similar types of assetswith very different degrees of credit risk.  For example, a loan to a “blue chip” corporation with atriple-A credit rating carries the same 100% risk weight under the 1988 Accord as a loan to aspeculative company with a below-investment grade rating.70  The 1988 Accord’s unsophisticatedtreatment of credit risk has enabled LCBOs to engage in “capital arbitrage” by (i) using complexderivatives, whose embedded risks are difficult to value, as substitutes for conventional financingarrangements, and (ii) structuring securitizations that  transfer low-risk assets out of the bankwhile retaining more risky assets (including residual interests in securitizations).71The 1988 Basel Accord also did not take account of the market risk of derivatives,securities and other trading assets held by banks.  In response to rapid increases in trading activityat large banks during the early 1990's, the Basel Committee adopted supplemental capital rules for
72  See GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note 71, at 49-53; Joao A.C. Santos, Bank CapitalRegulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature, Bank for Int’l SettlementsWorking Paper No. 90, Sept. 2000 (<available at www.bis.org>), at 18, 21. 
73  See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 7-10, 17-29; D. Johannes Jüttner,Message to Basle: Risk Reduction Rather Than Management, in NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, supranote 28, at 207, 208-09, 217-18.
74  See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American BusinessEnterprise, in ERIC A. POSNER, ED., CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Foundation Press,2000),  at 65 [hereinafter cited as Miller, Solvency Regulation], at  78; Joe Peek & Er ic S. Rosengren, TheUse of Capital Ratios to Trigger Intervention in Problem Banks: Too Little, Too Late, New Eng. Econ.Rev., Sept./Oct. 1996, at 49 [hereinafter cited as Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios], at 50-52, 56-57;GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study, supra note 69, at 61. 41
market risk in early 1996, and those rules were promptly implemented by federal bank regulators. The capital rules for market risk require large banks with significant trading assets to establishtheir capital requirements based on internal risk models that measure their “value at risk,” orVAR, subject to periodic reviews by federal regulators.72  The Basel Committee’s 2001 proposalwould extend this supervisory trend toward reliance on internal risk management by allowingqualifying banks to use internal risk ratings for loans in calculating their capital requirements forcredit risk and operational risk.73As the foregoing summary indicates, federal regulators have repeatedly adjusted theircapital rules over the past two decade in an effort to discourage banks from taking excessive risks. However, capital rules have not proven to be a sufficient safeguard.  Past banking crises haveshown that capital is a “lagging indicator” of bank problems, because declines in capital arefrequently not reported until banks have already become seriously troubled.74  One  reason for thistime lag is that many assets held by banks (e.g., commercial loans, OTC derivatives and residualinterests in securit izations) are not traded on any organized market and are therefore very difficultfor regulators and outside investors to value.  Accordingly, outsiders frequently do not identify
75  See, e.g., Berger, Herring & Szegö, supra note 43, at 411-16, 425; Jeffrey W. Gunther &Robert R. Moore, Financial Statements and Reality: Do Troubled Banks Tell All?, Econ. & Fin. Rev., Fed.Res. Bank of Dallas, TX, 3d Qtr. 2000, at 30; Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios, supra note 74, at 51, 57;GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 43-44.  
76  See Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 144-48; GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 14-21.
77  See GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 26-28 & tbls. 2.1 & 2.2 (stating that (i) banks aredeemed “adequately capitalized” under the PCA rules if they have (A) Tier 1 capital equal to 4% of r isk-based assets and 4% of total assets, and (B) total capital equal to 8% of risk-based assets; and (ii) morethan 98% of all banks and thrifts satisfied this  “adequately capitalized” standard at  the end of 1992).  Seealso Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 146-48 (contending that federal regulators set the “adequatelycapitalized” threshold too low); Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios, supra note 74, at 57 (same).
78  See GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study, supra  note 69, at  85-87,  91 (sta ting that,  as ofSeptember 1990, (i) 96% of all banks met the 8% total risk-based capital requirement for “adequately42
problems of asset depreciation and reductions in capital until significant damage has alreadyoccurred.  Moreover, managers of a troubled bank are inclined to postpone any writedowns ofassets and capital in the hope that they can improve the bank’s situation before its nextsupervisory examination or required public disclosure to investors.75FDICIA’s PCA regime was designed to strengthen the effectiveness of capital regulationand to discourage supervisory forbearance.  FDICIA requires bank regulators to  schedule yearlyexaminations for most banks (including all large banks), and it also compels regulators to take aseries of progressively more stringent enforcement measures if a bank falls below the “adequatelycapitalized” standard or below two lower capital thresholds.76  However, federal regulatorsweakened the effectiveness of PCA by choosing a lenient capital adequacy test.   Virtually allbanks met this “adequately capitalized” standard when the PCA rules took effect in 1992, eventhough the banking industry was just emerging from a major crisis.77  It appears that federalregulators deliberately chose a low capital threshold for PCA because many large banks could nothave met a higher standard during the early 1990's.78  Studies have confirmed that PCA’s
capitalized” status under the 1988 Accord, but (ii) 56% of all banks larger than $1 billion would havefailed to meet the total risk-based capital standard if it were raised to 10%).  The GAO was not  satisfiedwith the 1988 Accord’s capital standards, finding that they were “too low to adequately compensate for thetypes of risks that exist in today’s highly competitive banking environment.”  Id. at 87.  
79  See David S. Jones & Kathleen K. King, The implementation of prompt corrective action: Anassessment, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 491, 493, 498-99, 508 (1995) (finding that, due to the lenient capitaladequacy test established by regulators, PCA rules would not have applied to the “vast majority” oftroubled banks even if those rules had been in force during the 1980's); Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios,supra note 74, at 52-56 (reaching the same conclusion).  See also GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 45 &tbl. 3.1 (finding that, during 1992-95, more than four-fifths of problem banks met the “adequatelycapitalized” test and therefore were not subject to mandatory enforcement measures under the PCA rules).
80  Jones & King, supra note 79, at 495.  Accord, Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios, supra note74, at 57.
81  See Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 146-49, 152-56; GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at5-7, 25-29, 41-49,  55-56; Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. & U.S. Treas. Dept.,  The Feasibility andDesirability of Mandatory Subordinated Debt, Dec. 2000 [hereinafter cited as Federal Subordinated DebtStudy], at ix.Superior  Bank, a federally-chartered thrift  with assets  of $2.3 billion, failed in July 2001 after thebank’s capital had been wiped out by a decline of more than $500 million in the value of the bank’s43
“adequately capitalized” threshold would not have identified most troubled banks during the1980's, and that the standard was also too low to capture most problem banks during the mid-1990's.79  In short, the capital adequacy test that triggers supervisory intervention under PCA is “anunreliable indicator of insolvency risk.”80  The regulators’ selection of a low capital “tripwire” forPCA creates serious doubts about whether they would return to a policy of supervisoryforbearance if they were confronted with a systemic crisis involving the potential failure of severallarge banks.  The recent  failure of Superior Bank raises additional questions about theeffectiveness of PCA, because regulators failed to recognize or respond to the severity of thebank’s problems until its capital was already deeply impaired by losses resulting from its high-risksubprime lending and securitization activities.81        
residual interests resulting from its securitization of $4 billion of subprime loans.  As the FDICacknowledged, Superior’s failure “illustrates the limits of [PCA] tools given to regulators,” because PCAsanctions are ineffective when regulators fail to recognize losses embedded in unmarketable assets, likesecuritization residuals, whose worth depends on “complex, assumption-driven” valuation models. Statement of FDIC Director John Reich on the Failure of Superior Bank, FSB, submitted to the SenateComm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Sept. 11, 2001 (available at<www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/chairman/sp11sep01.html>), at 1.  See also Rob Blackwell, Failure ofSuperior Turns Quickly Into Blame Game, Am. Banker, July 31, 2001,  at 1; Rob Blackwell, DoesSuperior Prove S&L Reforms a Flop?, Am. Banker, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1.
82  See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing widespread instances of capital arbitrageby major banks).
83  See Tina M. Galloway, Winson B. Lee & Dianne M. Roden, Banks’ changing incentives andopportunities for risk taking, 21 J. Banking & Fin. 509, 513-15, 521-23 (1997) (finding that, during 1990-94, stricter federal regulations “did not appear to have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior” bybanks that had low charter values and “high risk-taking incentives”); Armen Hovakimian & Edward J.Kane, Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994, 55 J. Fin. 451, 452,461-64 (2000) (finding that (i) during 1992-94, stricter federal rules “curtailed but did not eliminate risk-shifting  incentives” by weak banks that sought to “extract a deposit insurance subsidy,” id. at 464,  and (ii)“the effectiveness of regulatory discipline declines as banks grow larger,” id. at 461).  
84  Miller, Solvency Regulation, supra note 74, at 78.  See also 2000 Meyer FFIEC Speech, supranote 59, at 2-3 (stating that (i) bankers “will arbitrage” whenever they believe that regulatory capitalrequirements exceed their own view of needed economic capital “by more than the cost of arbitrage,” and44
Another continuing problem with capital regulation is the ability of LCBOs to engage in“capital arbitrage.”  As discussed above, large sophist icated banks have repeatedly reduced theireffective capital requirements by exploiting gaps in regulatory capital rules.  Big banks shifted tooff-balance-sheet commitments to evade the simple leverage requirements of the 1980's, and theyimplemented large-scale securitization programs to exploit the risk-based rules established underthe 1988 Accord.82  Two recent studies have confirmed that higher regulatory capitalrequirements failed to eliminate high-risk bank strategies during the early 1990's,  especiallyamong larger banks.83  Thus, the experience of the past two decades indicates that capitalregulation “is inevitably imperfect in its application and encourages all sorts of regulatoryavoidance measures.”84  
(ii) “regardless of [regulatory] actions, frontier banks will always attempt to manage their businesses toearn competitive risk-adjusted rates of return on equity”) (emphasis in original).
85  See Jeremy Berkowitz & James O’Brien, How Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models atCommercial Banks?, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser. , Working Paper2001-31, July 2001 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001>), at 3-5 (finding that VARmodels for trading activities at six major U.S. banks failed to anticipate large trading losses during the1998 disruption in world financial markets, as the models’ predictions of maximum possible losses were“blown out” by the losses actually incurred); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, PartsI(E)(2)(b)(iii)(C), I(E)(2)(c) & I(E)(2)(e)(iii)(B) (discussing shortcomings in VAR and credit scoringmodels developed by J.P. Morgan and other large banks).
86  For analysis of the questionable methodologies underlying the market risk and credit risk modelsused by major banks, see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(2)(b)(iii)(C) (discussingmajor flaws in bank models for market risk); Patricia Jackson & William Perraudin, Regulatoryimplications of credit risk modelling, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 1 (2000) (discussing various problems withbank models for credit risk and concluding that “capital requirements based directly on credit risk modelsare simply not a pract ical possibility in the near future”); Robert  A. Jarrow & Stuart  M. Turnbull,  Theintersection of market and credit risk, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 271, 272-78 (2000) (discussing seriousproblems with the “standard methodologies for credit risk management” used at most banks, id. at 273);45
The Basel Committee and federal bank regulators are attempting to grapple with theseshortcomings in capital regulation for LCBOs by shifting from uniform rules to an individualizedapproach that relies on internal risk management policies developed by each LCBO.  However,this effort to base capital requirements on LCBOs’ internal risk ratings is a highly problematicmove.  Bank credit scoring models failed to anticipate the surge in consumer defaults on creditcard loans that occurred during 1996-97.  Similarly, “Value-at-Risk” (“VAR”) models developedby J.P. Morgan and other leading banks did not predict the severe trading losses that occurredduring the global financial market disruption triggered by Russia’s debt default in 1998.85  Studieshave shown that the most widely-used bank models for estimating market risk and credit risk areunreliable, because (i) they are based on faulty assumptions and insufficient data, and (ii) theypermit banks to pursue strategies that may prove to be disastrous, because they tolerate a low-percentage risk of catastrophic losses.86  Another glaring problem is that conventional risk models
Jüttner, supra note 71, at 208-19 (same); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?  TwoThumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 619,  660-61 (1999) (sta ting that “eventhe most sophisticated current methods of analyzing credit risk are seriously flawed”).Other studies conclude that  VAR models used by regulators to determine capital requirements formarket risk create a perverse incentive for banks.  These VAR-based capital rules penalize banks thatexceed a defined risk threshold on more than 1% of trading days during a 250-day trading period. However,  the VAR rules do not assess any additional penalties based on the magnitude of losses that abank may incur during those “outlier” days.  Because the VAR rules focus on the frequency rather than themagnitude of trading losses, the rules encourage profit-maximizing banks to construct r isky asset portfoliosthat may produce larger gains but also tolerate a low-percentage risk of catastrophic losses.  See Gordon J.Alexander & Alexandre M. Baptista , A VaR-Constrained Mean-Variance Model: Implications forPortfolio Selection and the Basle Capital Accord, Working Paper, July 16, 2001, passim (available at<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275894>); Suleyman Basak & Alexander Shapiro,Value-at-Risk-Based Management: Optimal Policies and Asset Prices, 14 Rev. Fin. Stud. 371, 372-80,385, 398-99 (2001). 
87  See Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 86, at 272 (quote), 273-77, 292-93; Jüttner, supra note 73,at 218-19, 223-25. 
88   See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 8 (quote), 17-23; Speech by FRBGovernor Laurence H. Meyer before the Institute of Int’l Bankers, May 5, 2001 (<available atwww.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited as Meyer IIB Speech], at 4-5, 7-8.46
evaluate market risk and credit risk in isolation from each other, contrary to abundant evidenceshowing that “market and credit risk are intrinsically related to each other and . . . are notseparable.”87The Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal “stop[s] short” of allowing banks to establish theircapital requirements based on “full [internal] credit risk models.”  Nevertheless, the proposalwould allow each qualifying bank to use internal risk ratings in estimating the probability ofdefault by borrowers and the banks’ exposure to loss in the event of default.88  Analysts havequestioned, however, whether most large banks have reliable internal risk management systems tocalculate even these more limited measures of credit risk and their potential correlations across
89  See Howell E. Jackson, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Establishment of CapitalStandards for Financial Institutions in a Global Economy (undated working paper on file with the author)[hereinafter cited as Jackson, Role of Credit Rating Agencies], at 9-15; Jüttner, supra note 73, at 208-22;John J. Mingo, Policy implications of the Federal Reserve study of credit risk models at major US bankinginstitutions, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 15, 25-29 (2000).
90  See GAO LCBO Study, supra note 55, at 41-42; GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note71, at 94.
91  See GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note 71, at 96-98.  See also Jackson, Role of CreditRating Agencies, supra  note 89, at  15 (questioning “how much regulatory authorities should delegate theestablishment of capital standards to bank management,” since “the reason why we regulate bank capitalrequirements in the first place is the belief that left to their own devices banks will maintain less capitalthan is socially desirable”). 47
entire loan portfolios.89A more fundamental problem is that  bank regulators and bankers have sharply conflictingmotivations in establishing capital standards.  Regulators and bankers have a shared interest inchoosing a capital level that will allow banks to earn profits and avoid a clear risk of insolvency. Beyond this common interest, however, the goals of regulators and bankers diverge significantly. Regulators want conservative capital rules that discourage imprudent risk-taking and protect thefederal safety net,  even at the expense of constraining bank profits.  In contrast, bankers wantliberal capital rules that permit higher leverage and a greater ability to exploit the federal safetynet subsidy, because those circumstances create the potential for higher shareholder returns. Accordingly, it is very doubtful whether federal regulators can rely on bankers to incorporatesupervisory concerns in their internal risk management process.90  Bankers would clearly have astrong incentive to manipulate their internal risk rating systems to reduce their effective capitalrequirements.91  In this regard, it is very troubling that the Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal offers LCBOsthe opportunity to reduce their capital requirements if they establish internal rating systems for
92  See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at  9 (stating that,  as an incentive forbanks to develop internal rat ings-based approaches, the proposal provides “capital incentives [for theinternal ratings-based approach] relative to the standardised approach”); June 2001 Basel Update, supranote 61 (confirming that the proposed new capital accord would give “capital incentives . . . to encouragebanks to adopt these more advanced approaches to credit risk”).  See also Meyer IIB Speech, supra note88, at 5, 7-8, 10 (sta ting that banks qualifying for  the internal ratings-based approach would have “lowertotal regulatory capital charges” and could experience “a significant decline in capital requirements relativeto current levels”). 
93  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(C) (discussing analysts’ and regulators’concerns about insufficient bank capital and reserves).
94  See KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 225-29; GAO LCBO Study,supra note 55, at 7, 48; GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note 71, at 98-99.48
credit risk.  The proposal essentially guarantees that banks with qualified internal rat ing systemswill receive lower capital requirements than banks whose capital levels are determined under theCommittee’s “standardised approach” for credit risk.  The Basel Committee thus appears to beinviting LCBOs to  develop internal rat ing systems for the specific purpose of reducing theircapital.92  This approach hardly seems consistent with recent evidence indicating that major banksdo not hold sufficient capital and reserves in light of their inherent risks.93A further problem with the Basel proposal is that regulators may not possess sufficientexpertise to understand and critique the internal risk management systems developed by LCBOs. Regulators generally cannot compete with major financial institutions in hiring highly-paidfinancial “rocket scientists” to design and analyze complex derivatives and other sophisticated riskmanagement tools.  Accordingly, regulators may not be able to verify, with a high degree ofconfidence, the internal risk models and ratings developed by financial conglomerates.94    Finally, the new supervisory strategy of basing capital requirements on internal riskmanagement raises the issue of how to deter LCBOs from deliberately or negligently reducingtheir capital below a level that  is reasonably needed to ensure their solvency.  A few years ago, the
95  See Jackson & Perraudin, supra note 86, at 11-12; GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note71, at 110-11.  In 1996, the New York Clearing House conducted a one-year test in which 10 major bankseach precommitted an amount of capital for market risk based on its internal risk models.  None of the 10banks incurred trading losses that exceeded its precommitted capital during the one-year test period.  Itshould be noted,  however, that (i) the precommitted capital amounts were less than the levels that wouldhave been required under the existing capital rules for market r isk, and (ii) the test occurred during a periodof relative calm in the financial markets.  While this test was too short to provide a reliable evaluation ofthe precommitment approach, it did suggest that LCBOs are likely to reduce their capital levels if they arepermitted to rely on internal risk models.  See id. at 112-13.
96  Cf. Mingo, supra note 89, at 17-18 (warning that “the pace of financial innovation is such thatsimply recognizing the act of [regulatory capital arbitrage (“RCA”)] is often quite difficult. .  . . The sheercomplexity and diversity of RCA, coupled with the limited budgets of supervisory agencies, make rapiddiscovery of RCA impractical, if not impossible”). 49
FRB considered a “precommitment” approach, under which LCBOs would commit to maintainadequate capital based on their internal risk management systems and would pay fines if theircapital allocations proved to be inadequate to meet their actual risks.  However, this“precommitment” approach was not adopted, and analysts have questioned whether regulatorswould actually be willing to impose penalties that were large enough to deter LCBOs frommanipulating their internal risk calculations.  As critics noted, major banks are most likely tosuffer capital shortfalls during periods of severe economic strain, and regulators wouldunderstandably be reluctant under those conditions to enforce large fines that might threaten thesolvency of troubled LCBOs.95  Unfortunately, the Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal does notsuggest any reliable mechanism for discouraging LCBOs from using aggressive methods ofinternal risk measurement as a new form of capital arbitrage.96C. Current Limitations on Supervisory and Market DisciplineBank supervision and market discipline share a common goal of discouraging banks fromtaking excessive risks.  Recent studies have shown that examinations by regulators and marketdiscipline by investors, analysts and credit rating agencies play complementary roles in restraining
97  See, e.g., Allen N. Berger, Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, Comparing Market andSupervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?, 32 J. Money, Credit &Banking 641 (2000); Robert DeYoung et al., The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings andSubordinated Debt Prices, 33 J. Money, Credit & Banking 900 (2001); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.Sys., Staff Study 172, Using Subordinated Debt as an Instrument of Market Discipline, Dec. 1999[hereinafter cited as FRB Staff Subordinated Debt Study], at 5, 12-15 (reviewing studies evaluating thecomparative effectiveness of regulators and market participants in disciplining banks). 
98  See Benton E. Gup, Market Discipline and the Corporate Governance of Banks: Theory vs.Evidence, in NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, supra note 28, at 187 [hereinafter cited as Gup, MarketDiscipline], at 195-99 (describing failures by regulators and investors to anticipate bank failures); HowellE. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1994)[hereinafter cited as Jackson, Holding Company Obligations], at 597 (sta ting that “ the [credit] ratingsservices . . . have not done a particularly good job at anticipating bank failures”); Richard E. Randall, Canthe Market Evaluate Asset Quality Exposure in Banks?, New Eng. Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Boston,MA, July/Aug. 1989, at 3 (concluding that investors, stock analysts and bond rating agencies all failed toidentify serious asset problems at 40 large banks during the 1980's until after substantial damage hadoccurred); Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 992 (citing studies with similar findings).
99  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(2)(b)(iii)(D), (E) & (G).50
risk-taking by banks.  It appears that differing oversight methods used by regulators and marketobservers enable each group to discover proprietary information about banks that is not readilyavailable to the other group.97Nevertheless, both bank regulators and the securities markets have often failed to identifyproblems at major financial institutions until those institutions were already seriously or fatallyinjured.  For example, federal regulators, credit rating agencies and investors did not recognize severe weaknesses at many large banks during the 1980's (including Continental Illinois and Bankof New England) until those banks were dangerously close to failure.98  Federal regulators alsofailed in 1998 to perceive the grave threat that Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) posedto leading banks and securities firms, as well as the financial markets generally, until the hedgefund revealed its perilous condition to the FRB-NY.99  Credit rating agencies did not anticipate thefailure of several large insurance companies in the early 1990's, or the Orange County bankruptcy
100  See Partnoy, supra note 86, at 661-62, 665.
101  See Rick Brooks, How Bad News of First Union Caught Many Analysts Napping, Wall St. J.,May 28, 1999, at  C1; Valerie Block, Sense of Betrayal on Wall St. After Wells Surprise, Am. Banker,  July21, 1997, at 1.
102  See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Garten, Lessons for the Next Financial Crisis, 78 Foreign Affairs No. 2,Mar. /April 1999, at 76, 76-83; Reuven Glick, Thoughts on the Origins of the Asian Crisis: Impulses andPropagation Mechanisms, in WILLIAM C. HUNT ER E T AL., EDS., THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRIS IS: ORIGINS,IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS (Kluwer Academic Pub., 1999) [hereinafter cited as ASIAN FINANC IALCRIS IS], at 33, 33-38, 47-51; Gup, Market Discipline, supra note 98, at 199-201; Jüttner, supra note 71, at215-17; KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 281-86; Karin Lissakers, The IMF andthe Asian Crisis: A View from the Executive Board, in ASIAN FINANCIAL CRIS IS, supra , at 3, 4-7; DavidMarshall, The crisis of 1998 and the role of the central bank, 25 Econ. Perspectives No. 1, Fed. Res. Bankof Chi., IL, 1st Qtr. 2001, at 2, 7 (stating that “[t]he Asian crisis was completely unforeseen by financialmarkets”).
103    Tom Fernandez, Reed Warns: Banks Not Equipped for Crisis, Am. Banker, Feb. 14, 2001, at2 (quoting John Reed).   See also Gup,  Market Discipline, supra note 98, at 199-201;  Hovakimian & Kane,supra note 81,  at 451 (stating that “the nation’s 100 largest banks lost almost one-fourth of their marketcapitalization during the third quar ter of 1998,” thereby indicating that “risk-modeling systems formanaging bank and taxpayer loss exposure are less effective than advertised”); Osman Kilic, David Tufte& M. Kabir Hassan, The 1994-95 Mexico Currency Crisis and U.S. Bank Stock Returns, 16 J. Fin.  Serv.51
in late 1994, or the defaults of several subprime consumer finance companies in 1997.100  Mostsecurities analysts expressed surprise when First Union and Wells Fargo publicly disclosed thedisastrous results of their mergers with CoreStates and First Interstate, respectively.101  In the international arena, the IMF, bank regulators, credit rating agencies and investors allfailed to anticipate the onset, severity and contagious effects of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 and the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98.102   Similarly, regulators, banks and investors didnot comprehend the potential risk exposures of major U.S. banks to those foreign crises.  Theformer co-chairman of Citigroup recently acknowledged that major banks, in spite of their costlyinvestments in risk management, failed to foresee major shocks to the global financial systemduring the 1990's, and he candidly acknowledged that “we don’t do very well in managing risk inthe financial sector.”103  
Res. 47, 57-59 (1999) (finding that the Mexican peso crisis was “surprising to traders” and causedsignificant volatility in the stock prices for big banks that had major lending exposures to Mexico); infranotes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing studies finding that investors failed to anticipate seriousproblems at large U.S. banks during 1975-94).  
104  See supra note 14 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, PartsI(A) & I(E)(2)(a)(iii) & (d). 52
Three primary factors appear to explain these repeated failures in supervisory and marketdiscipline of LCBOs.   First , major banks have become more complex and harder to evaluate byregulators and the financial markets over the past three decades.  Second, all of the three leadingexternal sources of discipline for large banks – securities analysts, rating agencies and bankregulators – are compromised to a substantial degree by conflicting interests and goals.  Third,while market  discipline is frequently ineffective in predicting the onset of financial crises, it can  beindiscriminate in punishing firms after a financial crisis begins.  As a consequence, regulatorshave consistently opposed any strong form of market discipline, based on their fear that investorswill engage in mass “flights to safety” during economic crises and thereby undermine the stabilityof financial markets.  1. The Growing Complexity and Opacity of Financial Conglomerates Big banks have increasingly specialized over the past three decades in providing loans toborrowers whose financial condition and future prospects cannot be readily assessed by thesecurities markets.  Improvements in information technology and financial innovations haveenabled the securities markets to underwrite debt securities for a broader range of issuers, therebyforcing large banks to shift their commercial lending focus to more risky and opaque firms.  As aresult, regulators and financial markets find it increasingly difficult to comprehend the risksembedded in bank loan portfolios.104  
105  See id., Parts I(A)(1), I(E)(1) & I(E)(2)(b) (discussing “opaque” nature of bank loans and OTCfinancial derivatives).  See also Partnoy, supra note 86, at  676-81 (describing credit derivatives as “amongthe most exotic, fastest growing, and perhaps most problematic segment of the derivatives market,” id. at676, and explaining that  “a risk buyer [under a  credit swap] can increase its exposure [to credit risk]without increasing the size of its balance sheet,” id. at 677).
106  See, e.g., Flannery, Financial Regulation, supra note 38, at 101-03, 105-09; KAUFMAN , ONMONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 71-83, 281-86, 329-37; Meyer FFIEC Speech, supra note 59, at1, 5-6; Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 15, 18; ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILDBEAST  OF FINANCE 252-65, 274-84 (1998); Steven A. Seelig, Banking Trends and Deposit Insurance RiskAssessment in the Twenty-First  Century,  in NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, supra note 28, at 129, 131-40. 53
Major banks have also increased their opacity to regulators and the securities markets by expanding their dealing and trading activities involving securities and OTC derivatives.  Like bankloans, OTC derivatives are privately-negotiated, customized financial instruments whose termsand potential financial impact are largely unknown to outsiders.105  OTC derivatives and complex,option-based securities enable banks (i) to place highly-leveraged bets on the direction of interestrates, currency rates and market prices for commodities, bonds and stocks, and (ii) to make rapidand fundamental changes in their risk exposures.  As a result of this new financial technology, it isextremely hard for regulators and market participants to evaluate the current financial condition ofmajor banks.  At the same time, financial conglomerates are creating new correlations amonginterest rate risk, credit risk and market risk as they combine traditional lending operations withinvestment banking and insurance activities.  Neither regulators nor market participants are wellpositioned to assess the potential dangers of these new risk correlations.106Three recent studies demonstrate the relative opacity of major banks to the financialmarkets.  One study found that investors did not anticipate either dividend cuts or regulatoryenforcement actions at seventeen big “money center” banks during 1975-92.  Publicannouncements of both types of events caused sharp, immediate declines in the stock prices of the
107  See Myron B. Slovin, Marie E. Slushka & John A. Polonchek, An anlysis of contagion andcompetitive effects at commercial banks, 54 J. Fin. Econ. 197 (1999).
108  See Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr. & David A. Carter, The reaction of bank stock prices to news ofderivatives losses by corporate clients, 23 J. Banking & Fin. 1725 (1999). 54
subject banks.  In addition, public disclosures of dividend cuts had significantly negativecontagious effects on the stock prices of other “money center” and regional banks.107  A secondstudy concluded that public reports of Bankers Trust’s legal problems in 1994 with disgruntledOTC derivatives clients had a significantly adverse impact on Bankers Trust’s stock price as wellas the stock prices of thirteen other banks that were leading dealers in OTC derivatives.108  Bothstudies indicate that the financial markets did not comprehend the potential risk exposures ofmajor banks until their problems were publicly disclosed.Finally, a third study determined that, during 1983-93, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’shad greater disagreements in their bond ratings for banks and insurance companies than for anyother type of firm.  In addition, the rating agencies’ disagreements over bond ratings for banksincreased after 1986, notwithstanding the efforts of Congress and bank regulators to  restrict thescope of the TBTF policy.  Donald Morgan, the study’s author, concluded that the largest banksbecame less transparent to credit rating agencies after 1986 as those banks increased their focuson trading in securities, OTC derivatives and other financial instruments.  The rating agenciesapparently found it difficult to assess the risks inherent in bank trading positions that changedrapidly and without timely notice to market participants.   The high concentrations of loans heldby big banks also increased their opacity, because the rating agencies could not readily measure
109  See Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, Fed. Res.Bank of N.Y., Staff Reports No. 105, May 2000 (available at <www.ny.frb.org>).  See also Morgan &Stiroh, supra note 36, at 504-06.
110  See, e.g., Gup, Market Discipline, supra note 98, at 201; Jeffrey M. Laderman, Wall Street’sSpin Game, Bus. Week, Oct. 5, 1998, at 148; Tom Lauricella, Deals & Deal Makers: Analyst ReportsPressures of Employer’s Trading, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at C1.  See also Liz Moyer, PrudentialContrarian Turns Sour on Banks, Am. Banker, Mar. 9, 2001, at 20 (reporting that Michael Mayo, afterreportedly being dismissed by Credit Suisse for bearish calls on major banks, joined Prudentia l Securitiesand felt free to issue “sell” recommendations for nine banks, because Prudential had closed down itsinvestment banking unit and instituted a new policy of “offering ‘objective’ stock analysis untainted by thedemands of in-house investment bankers”).In June 2001, the Securities Industry Association issued voluntary guidelines for “best practices”designed to protect the independence and objectivity of securities analysts.  However, members of Congressand analysts sharply criticized these guidelines as being inadequate to cure the structural conflicts ofinterest inherent in major Wall Street firms.  See, e.g., Rob Garver, Baker, Oxley on SIA Guidelines: NotEnough, Am. Banker, June 15, 2001, at  4; Emily Thornton, Commentary: Wall Street’s Chinese WallsAren’t Strong Enough, Bus. Week, Aug. 27, 2001, at 56.55
the creditworthiness of the borrowers.1092. Conflicting Interests and Objectives among Outside MonitorsThe effectiveness of the principal outside monitors for LCBOs – financial analysts, creditrating agencies and regulators – is undermined to a substantial degree by their conflictingincentives and goals.  Financial analysts have become more lenient in their assessment of largebanks in recent years, due to the employment of most leading analysts by major securities firms. Wall Street firms obviously want to sell investment banking services to major banks, andinvestment bankers within those firms have therefore brought intense pressure on their analystcolleagues to issue favorable investment reports for leading banks.  Indeed, securities firms havedismissed several prominent analysts who expressed bearish or critical opinions about big banks.110 
Similarly, the independence and reliability of credit ratings  have declined as rating
111  See Partnoy, supra note 86, at 623-24, 681-83,  688-703.  See also Lawrence J. White, TheCredit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis,  N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Bus. Working PaperNo. 01-001, April 20, 2001 (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=267083>), at 5,10-14, 23-24.
112  Partnoy, supra note 86, at 703.  See also id. at 651-54, 681-82 (contending that,  by virtue oftheir ability to sell “regulatory licenses,” the nationally-recognized rating agencies operate under“oligopolistic” conditions that enable them (i) to “earn abnormal profits” by charging large fees to issuers,(ii) to make modest investments in their credit review operations, including the payment of below-averagesalaries to their analysts) (quotes at 682); White, supra note 111, at 10-19, 23-25 (reaching similarconclusions). 56
agencies have gained the power to issue “regulatory licenses” to bond issuers.  Rules adopted byfederal and state regulators since 1975 have greatly restricted the ability of banks, mutual fundsand insurance companies to purchase debt securities that do not carry investment-grade ratingsfrom nationally-recognized rating agencies.  Issuers are willing to pay substantial fees to thedesignated rating agencies to earn high ratings, because those ratings serve as de facto regulatorylicenses and permit the sale of bonds to institutional investors.111  Professor Frank Partnoy contends that these regulations “have fundamentally changed thenature of the product rating agencies sell.  Today, issuers are paying rating fees, not to purchasecredibility with the investor community, but rather to purchase a license [to sell bonds] from theregulators.”  As a result, rating agencies focus primarily on the opportunity to earn lucrative feesfrom bond issuers, instead of making costly investments to protect their reputation for accurateratings.  Rating agencies have concluded that they can “maintain whatever credibility they need byparroting market price moves,” since it is “easy to follow market events and adjust ratings afterthe fact.”112  The unfortunate results of these changed incentives for rating agencies are that (i) bondratings have become “lagging indicators of credit quality,” and (ii) the rating agencies have
113  See Partnoy, supra note 86, at 659 (quoting Prof. Bruce Lehmann), 662.
114  See id. at 659; Jackson, Role of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 89, at 16-18; White, supranote 111, at 1, 31-32.
115  See, e.g., Kane, Megamerger Incentives, supra note 36, at 689-94; Santomero & Eckles, supranote 38, at 18-19; Stern, supra note 39, at 3, 24-26. 57
become subject to increased pressure to provide high ratings to powerful issuers.113  Given thesedevelopments, some analysts have criticized proposals (including the new Basel capital adequacyproposal) that would rely on credit ratings of borrowers in determining capital requirements forbanks under the “standardised approach” for calculating credit risk.  These analysts fear that usingcredit ratings as a supervisory tool could intensify the pressures on rating agencies – fromborrowers, banks and even regulators – to provide favorable ratings for important borrowers,especially during times of financial stress.114Bank regulators also have conflicting goals that often lead them to adopt a policy ofsupervisory forbearance toward LCBOs.  Despite their policy interest in preventing moral hazard,regulators have a personal reputational interest in postponing the recognition of big bank failuresso that a major, well-publicized disaster will not occur “on their watch.”  In addition, duringfinancial crises,  regulators are strongly influenced by their fear that a major bank failure couldtrigger a systemic panic within the financial system.115  This regulatory dilemma was vividlyillustrated during the banking crisis of 1980-92, when regulators consistently chose to rescue (orat least  postpone the failure) of big banks.  In structuring bailouts of First Pennsylvania andContinental Illinois, in postponing the failures of First RepublicBank and Bank of New England,and in providing extensive forbearance to Bank of America and Cit icorp, regulators repeatedlydemonstrated their preference for maintaining financial stability.   There is little doubt  that the
116  See JAMES R. BARTH, R. DAN BRUMBAUGH , JR. & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE FUTURE OFAMERICAN BANKING 21-57,  65-79,  89-94,  110-16, 160-62 (1992); John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler,  TheRole of Large Banks in the Recent U.S. Banking Crisis, 18 Q. Rev. No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis,MN, Winter 1994, at 2 passim; Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 994-1002; Wilmarth,Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(4)(b)(iv) & I(E)(1).
117  See, e.g., Kane, Megamerger Incentives, supra note 36, at 673-74, 691-94; KAUFMAN , ONMONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 206-10, 226-30, 237-38, 280-86; Marshall, supra note 102, at 2-6, 13-15; Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 18-19; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, PartsI(A)(2)(b), I(D)(4)(b)(iv) & III(B). 58
regulators’ accommodating treatment of TBTF institut ions increased moral hazard and risk-takingamong large banks.116 The emergence of bank-centered financial conglomerates during the 1990's, and the GLBAct’s explicit blessing for those conglomerates, will almost certainly intensify the TBTF problemsthat afflicted bank regulators during the 1980-92 crisis.  Most analysts assume that regulators willnot allow a big universal bank or any of its significant subsidiaries to fail.  This assumption findssupport in the FRB’s aggressive actions to stabilize the financial markets following the Russiandebt crisis of 1998, when the FRB (i) organized the rescue of LTCM to prevent a failure thatcould have created serious “spillover” effects for several major financial institutions, (ii) arrangedthe sale of a deeply-troubled Bankers Trust to Deutsche Bank, and (iii) orchestrated three rapidcuts in short-term interest rates to restore liquidity and confidence in the financial markets.  TheFRB’s 1998 actions – particularly when viewed against the background of its similar stabilizingactions during the 1970 Penn Central crisis, the 1980 Hunt silver crisis and the 1987 stock marketcrash – have created strong expectations that federal regulators will intervene to prevent thefailure not only of big banks but also of major nonbanking firms whose default could threaten thesolvency of large banks or the stability of the financial markets.117  Such expectations obviously
118  See, e.g, Flannery, Financial Regulation, supra note 38, at 102, 107-08; KAUFMAN , ONMONEY & MARKETS, supra note 34, at 208-10, 226-28, 238-40; Stern, supra note 39, at 4, 24-27.59
undermine the incentives of creditors to monitor and control risk-taking by large financialconglomerates.118 3. Limitations on the Effectiveness of Market Discipline as a RiskControl Device for Universal Banksa. The Inconsistency of Market Discipline   The reliability of market discipline as a risk control device is also limited by the fact thatfinancial markets often appear to be ineffective in predicting the onset of economic crises andindiscriminate in punishing risky firms after crises occur.  Recent studies have shown that marketdiscipline fluctuates in its intensity, with more relaxed monitoring in good times and morestringent oversight  during periods of financial stress.  The varying intensity of market discipline isexemplified by the tendency of investors to act with excessive optimism during an expansionary“bubble” and to panic when the “bubble” bursts.  For example, during the mid-1990's, financialinstitut ions and other investors from developed nations disregarded potential warning signs andmade huge investments in Latin America, Asia and Russia.  However, when subsequent eventsrevealed the full risks of those investments, foreign investors engaged in frenzied “flights tosafety” that had a devastating impact on developing economies.  The crises of the 1990's, likeearlier “boom-and-bust cycles” in domestic and foreign economies since 1970, show how difficultit is for market participants and regulators (i) to avoid an excessive expansion of credit andspeculative activities during the “bubble” phase of an economic boom, and (ii) to prevent a
119  See, e.g., Allen & Gale, supra note 52, at 236-40, 247-54; Bernanke & Gertler, supra note 45,at 17-21; Chang & Velasco, supra note 45; Kaufman, Banking Architecture, supra note 28, at 46-47;Kaufman, Banking Crises, supra note 43, at 11-18; KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34,at 68-83, 201-25, 270-325; Marshall, supra note 102, at 2-8, 13-15; ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRAT IONALEXUBERANCE 96-132, 203-33 (2000). 60
liquidity crisis in the financial markets and a sharp contraction in credit after the “bubble” bursts.119 
The information technology and telecommunications sectors experienced a similar “boom-and-bust cycle” in the United States and Europe during 1996-2001.  Investors bid up the stocksof high-technology companies to stratospheric levels during the bull market of the late 1990's. During the same period, banks, venture capital funds and other institutional investors providedabundant debt and equity financing to Internet and telecommunications ventures.  By the spring of2000, however, it became evident that (i) the “new economy” would not continue to grow at therapid pace of the 1990's,  and (ii) Internet and telecommunicat ions firms could not meet theiroptimistic forecasts for revenues and earnings, because they had created operating capacity thatfar exceeded near-term customer demand for their services.  As financial markets recognized themagnitude of these adverse developments, investors sold off shares of high-tech companies andthe markets for initial public offerings, junk bonds and bank loans virtually shut down for Internetand telecommunications firms.  Between March 2000 and July 2001, the NASDAQ stock market lost  60% of its value andhigh-tech stock markets in Europe fared even worse.  Unfortunately, the damage caused by thebursting of the Internet “bubble” was not confined to high-technology sectors.  The Internet“bust” triggered a generalized slowdown in U.S. and European economies and posed a significantthreat to the health of major financial institutions.  By the fall of 2001, some analysts warned that
120  For discussion of the events discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, see, e.g., FranklinAllen, Do Financial Institutions Matter?, 56 J. Fin. 1165, 1168-71 (2001); SHILLER, supra note 119, at 3-41; Rebecca Blumenstein et al. , Downed Lines: Telecom Sector’s Bust Reverberates Loudly Across theEconomy, Wall St. J., July 25, 2001, at A1; Michael J. Mandel, Commentary: In a One-World Economy, aSlump Sinks All Boats, Bus. Week, June 25, 2001, at 38;  A global game of dominoes – The worldeconomy, Economist, Aug. 25, 2001 (Special Rep.) (retr ieved through LEXIS-NEXIS); Germany’s NeuerMarkt: Penny bazaar, Economist, July 21, 2001 (retr ieved through LEXIS-NEXIS); Lea Paterson, Lessonsfrom history may help America to recover,  The Times (London, UK), Oct. 2, 2001 (retrieved throughLEXIS-NEXIS); William C. Symonds et al., Corporate America Braces for the Shakeout, Bus. Week, Oct.15, 2001, at 44; Heather Timmons, Feeling the Telecom’s Pain: Insurers and Banks, Bus. Week, April 23,2001, at 110; Thornton, Wall Street, supra note 25.
121  A discussion of psychological factors that may contribute to investor euphoria or panic isbeyond the scope of this work.  For recent discussions of these factors, see, e.g. , David Hirshleifer, InvestorPsychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. Fin. 1533 passim (2001); SHILLER, supra note 119, at 135-232. 
122  See, e.g., Randall,  supra  note 98, at  4, 7-14, 18 (finding that equity investors failed to perceiveserious problems at 40 large U.S. banks during the 1980's until severe damage had already occurred); John61
financial institutions with heavy exposures to syndicated loans and junk bonds could face lossescomparable to those suffered by the banking and thrift industries during the 1980's.120The foregoing evidence indicates that market discipline does not exert a consistentrestraining force on managerial risk-taking.  Investors are prone to engage in periodic cycles ofeuphoria and panic, due in part to their uncertainty about the direct ion of the economy and thesoundness of financial intermediaries.121  These cycles of investor sentiment are evident in thebanking industry as well as the general economy.  Studies of recent banking crises in the UnitedStates and Latin America have concluded that investors and depositors (i) failed to restrain risk-taking by bank managers until a financial crisis revealed that their institutions had already sufferedsevere harm, (ii) typically reacted to a crisis in the short term by punishing all banks exposed tothe crisis, with only a limited degree of discrimination among banks with differing risk exposures,and (iii) applied a more effective and discriminating form of discipline only after the crisis hadpassed.122  Benton Gup has summarized the historical record of market discipline as a risk control
S. Jordan, Insiders’ Assessments of the Stock Market’s Pricing of New England Bank Stocks, 1988 to1991, New Eng. Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, MA, July/Aug. 1997, at 3 passim (concluding that(i) while equity investors punished the stocks of failing banks most severely, they aggressively sold  thestocks of all publicly-traded New England banks during the regional banking crisis of 1989-91,  and (ii)insiders at  New England banks that ultimately survived recognized that the market had overreacted andmade substantial purchases of their own bank’s stock); Maria S. M. Peria & Sergio L. Schmukler, DoDepositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior?  Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises,56 J. Fin. 1029, 1030-31, 1048-50 (2001) (finding that,  during 1981-97, depositors in Argentina, Chile andMexico provided limited discipline before banking crises, engaged in generalized panics (with littleattention to “bank fundamentals”) during crises, and applied effective discipline based on “bankfundamentals” only after crises had passed).  
123  Gup, Market Discipline, supra note 98, at 202.62
device as follows:[B]ank regulators hope that market discipline will aid them in their task of banksupervision.  This chapter questioned the effectiveness of market discipline.  Thetrack record of market discipline examined here suggests that it usually occursafter a significant incident, and that it does little to prevent misbehavior. . . . Ifmarket discipline means survival of the fittest, it works.  If market discipline meanscontrolling behavior, it does not appear to be effective.123      Notwithstanding this cautionary evidence regarding the limitations of market discipline,several prominent analysts have argued that a mandatory subordinated debt program for LCBOswould effectively control managerial risk-taking and supervisory forbearance.  Under thisapproach, LCBOs would be required to issue subordinated debt on a frequent and continuingbasis in order to satisfy a designated portion of their capital requirements.  According toproponents of market discipline, holders of subordinated debt have strong incentives to controlrisk, because (i) subordinated debtholders face a greater risk of loss and (unlike equity holders) donot receive potential gains when managers pursue speculative strategies, (ii) in contrast todeposits, subordinated debt issues have relatively long maturities that prevent their holders fromengaging in sudden “runs,” and (iii) based on the FDIC’s record of dealing with large failing bankssince 1984, holders of subordinated debt issued by LCBOs would feel more exposed to loss than
124  See FRB Staff Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 97, at 2-3 (summarizing arguments infavor of mandatory subordinated debt programs).
125  For prominent examples of mandatory subordinated debt proposals, see, e.g., Charles W.Calomiris, Building an incentive-compatible safety net, 23 J. Banking & Fin. 1499, 1510-14 (1999);Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Subordinated debt as bank capital: A proposal for regulatoryreform, 24 Econ. Perspectives No. 2, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 2d Qtr. 2000, at 40, 43-46.63
holders of uninsured deposits.124  Advocates claim that a mandatory subordinated debt program would discourage LCBOsfrom taking excessive risks as long as regulators took appropriate steps based on “yield spreads” between the interest payable on each LCBO’s subordinated debt and interest rates for either risk-free Treasury bills or low-risk corporate bonds.  The weakest form of discipline would occur ifregulators had discretion to use an LCBO’s high yield spreads as a “warning signal” to justifymore stringent supervisory oversight.  A more stringent form of discipline would result if highyield spreads forced regulators to apply sanctions against the LCBO under the PCA regime.  Thestrongest form of discipline would take place if regulators prohibited each LCBO from issuingsubordinated debt with yield spreads that exceeded a specified limit.  Under the third approach,LCBOs that could not issue qualifying subordinated debt would be forced to shrink their assets toremain in compliance with capital rules.  Proponents of mandatory subordinated debt generallyfavor the last two approaches because they minimize regulatory discret ion and reduce thepotential for supervisory forbearance.125    The effectiveness of a mandatory subordinated debt program depends, in substantial part,on whether yield spreads provide an accurate measure of bank-specific risk.  Unfortunately,several studies have questioned, on at least three grounds, whether yield spreads can accuratelyand consistently distinguish between the relative risks posed by banks.  First, yield spreads on
126  See Federal Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 81, at 24-25, 27-28, 54-56; FRB StaffSubordinated Debt Study, supra note 97, at 16-24, 44, 48, 56-58. 
127  See Robert R. Bliss, Market discipline and subordinated debt: A review of some salient issues,25 Econ. Perspectives No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 1st Qtr. 2001, at  24, 25, 29-37;  Diana Hancock64
bank subordinated debt have shown the same recurring pattern of relaxation and constraint thatoccurs more generally in the financial markets during “boom-and-bust” cycles.  For example,credit markets maintained relatively low differentials between the yields on subordinated debtissued by low-risk and higher-risk banks during recent periods of relative stability in the bankingindustry (e.g., the mid-1980's and 1992-96).  In contrast, during recent  periods of significantstress in the banking industry (e.g. , 1988-91 and 1997-98), yield spreads widened considerablybetween subordinated debt issued by low-risk and higher-risk banks.  Thus, investors exertedstricter discipline against more risky banks only after their underlying problems had been revealedby adverse economic conditions.126  A second problem is that yield spreads between bank subordinated debt and eitherTreasury bills or low-risk corporate bonds are “noisy” measures of relative bank risk, becausethose spreads reflect general economic hazards and industry-wide problems as well as bank-specific risks.  A third difficulty is that yield spreads are significantly affected by the age and sizeof subordinated debt issues and the size of the issuing bank.  Recent studies have shown thatinvestors apply significant discounts to older or smaller issues of subordinated debt (due toconcerns about liquidity), and also to debt issued by midsized banks that are believed to lackprotection under the TBTF doctrine.  Given these complications, many observers have warnedthat substantial further empirical work must be done before yield spreads can be used withconfidence in evaluating the comparative risks of banks.127
& Myron L.  Kwast,  Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is It  Feasible?,  J. Fin.Serv. Res. (2001) (forthcoming); Federal Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 81, at 24-30; FRB StaffSubordinated Debt Study, supra note 97, at 46-49, 56-58.
128  See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital,  and theMacroeconomy, Working Paper, Oct. 9. 2000 (copy on file with the author); FRB Staff Subordinated DebtStudy, supra note 97, at 35-36, 63-66.  For discussions of the impact of higher U.S. bank capitalrequirements on the “credit crunch” of the early 1990's, see, e.g., Robert T. Clair & Paula Tucker,  SixCauses of the Credit Crunch, Econ. Rev.,  Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, TX, 3d Qtr.  1993, at 1, 5-10; Joe Peek65
Perhaps the greatest potential drawback of a mandatory subordinated debt rule is itstendency to aggravate the impact of banking crises on the broader economy.  As indicated above,proponents of a mandatory program want regulators to respond to  high yield spreads with strictsanctions for troubled LCBOs.  Thus, for example, if an LCBO failed to issue subordinated debtwith acceptable yield spreads, regulators would compel the bank to shrink its assets and,potentially, could appoint a receiver for the bank under the PCA regime.  The problem with thisapproach is that banks usually find it very difficult to issue risky securities (e.g., equity capital orsubordinated debt) at precisely the time when they need new capital most desperately – viz.,during a severe economic downturn that produces widespread business failures and causessignificant loan losses for many banks.  If troubled banks are ordered to increase their capitalratios during a serious recession, their most likely response is to cut their lending drastically whenthey cannot find investors for new issues of stock or subordinated debt.  Bank retrenchments inlending and, in the worst case, bank failures disrupt credit relationships with borrowers, therebyaggravating the economic downturn that triggered bank capital problems in the first place.  Forexample, during the early 1990's, a rapid rise in nonperforming bank loans and the imposition ofhigher capital requirements forced many banks to curtail their lending sharply, resulting in aprolonged “credit crunch.”128
& Eric Rosengren, Bank regulation and the credit crunch, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 679 (1995); Ronald E.Shrieves & Drew Dahl, Regulation, Recession, and Bank Lending Behavior: The 1990 Credit Crunch, 9 J.Fin. Serv. Res. 5 (1995); Larry D. Wall & David R.  Peterson, Bank holding company capital targets in theearly 1990s: The regulators versus the markets, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 563 (1995). 
129  See Calomiris, supra note 125, at 1510-16 (suggesting that the government could purchasepreferred stock to recapitalize banks and maintain a reasonable flow of bank credit during severe economiccrises);  Evanoff & Wall, supra note 125,  at 47-48, 51 n.29 (suggesting that regulators could provide“temporary relief” from subordinated debt rules if corporate bond markets were frozen by a generalized“liquidity crunch”).  
130  See, e.g., 1999 Greenspan IMF Speech, supra note 48, at 1-3; 2000 Meyer NBER Speech,supra note 56, at 1-4. 66
Advocates of mandatory subordinated debt recognize that their proposal’s mosttroublesome feature is its inherent tendency to amplify business downturns.  As a safety valve,proponents have suggested the concept of limited supervisory waivers during economic crises toprevent severe disruptions in credit flows.129  This concession demonstrates that strict marketdiscipline creates very difficult tradeoffs between the benefits of eliminating moral hazard and therisks of undermining financial stability. As discussed in the next section, it is likely that regulatorswill choose a policy of stabilization and supervisory forbearance whenever a financial crisisthreatens to set off a generalized panic among investors.     b. Resistance to Market Discipline among Regulators and MajorBanksBank regulators fully comprehend the harsh effects of market discipline during financialcrises.130  For that reason, they have shown little enthusiasm for any “strong” form of marketoversight, despite their recent expressions of support for better monitoring by investors.  For example, during the banking crisis of 1989-91 regulators and other policymakerslamented many of the adverse effects of market discipline (e.g.,  frequent bank failures, the
131  See Helen A. Garten, Whatever  Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?, 1991 Ann. Surveyof Am. L. 749, 750-54, 776-83.
132  See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text; Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 146-49;GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 20-21, 36-40, 49-52 (explaining that federal regulators weakenedsafety-and soundness requirements included in the PCA regime by adopting discretionary guidelines insteadof mandatory operating rules).
133  See Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 149 (discussing regulators’ opposition to market-value accounting rules for bank assets).  The FRB joined the banking industry in opposing the decision ofthe Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) to adopt Statement of Financial AccountingStandards (“FAS”) 115 in 1993.  FAS 115 requires banks to “mark to market” all investment securitiesexcept for those that are properly designated as “held to maturity.”  Bank executives and federal regulatorsargued that FAS 115 would increase the “volatility” of bank earnings and expose banks to suddenshortfalls in their capital.  See David Siegel, Capital: FASB Votes to Adopt Mark-to-Market Rule, Am.Banker, April 14, 1993, at 1; Barbara A. Rehm, Rising Rates Put Banks in Double Bind, Am. Banker,May 13, 1994, at 1 (quoting FRB chairman Alan Greenspan).  Similarly, the FRB supported the banking industry’s strong objection to FASB’s decision to adoptFAS 133 in 1998.   FAS 133 requires banks to apply market-value accounting principles to all derivativesexcept for those that qualify for hedging treatment.  Once again, bank executives and federal regulatorsasserted that FASB’s new rule would create undesirable “volatility” in the reported earnings of banks.   SeeElizabeth McDonald, Greenspan Urges FASB to Drop Plan On Adjusting Earnings for Derivatives, WallSt.  J.,  Aug. 7, 1997, at B2; Aaron Elstein, Banks Decry Plan to Make Them Report Derivatives’ MarketValue, Am. Banker, Nov. 19, 1996, at A1; OCC Bull. 98-45, Oct. 6, 1998, reprinted in Fed. Banking L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 62-158 (explaining the impact of FAS 133 on banks).67
inability of most banks to raise new capital, and the “credit crunch” that resulted from the inabilityof capital-constrained banks to make new loans).131  Regulators also did their best to weaken therestrictions on supervisory forbearance established by FDICIA’s PCA regime.132  During the mid-1990's,  regulators joined the banking industry in trying unsuccessfully to block changes inaccounting rules that required banks to adopt market-value accounting principles for assets held intrading accounts.  The new accounting rules were specifically designed to improve marketdiscipline by making the financial operations of banks more transparent to investors. Nevertheless, regulators and the banking industry claimed that the new rules would have adestabilizing effect by creating more “volatility” in the reported earnings of banks.133    
134  Federal Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 81, at 56.  
135  Id. at 53-56.  See also supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing the risk that amandatory subordinated debt policy could aggravate economic downturns).
136  Id. at vii. 
137  Rob Garver, Skepticism Rising on Market as Regulator, Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 2001, at 1[hereinafter cited as Garver, Market as Regulator] (quoting Bert Ely). 68
The most recent evidence of regulatory opposition to strict market discipline can be seenin the joint decision by the FRB and the Treasury Department to reject a mandatory subordinateddebt program for LCBOs.  In December 2000, the two agencies announced that they would notadopt a rule requiring major banks to issue subordinated debt satisfying specified rating and yieldrequirements.  The agencies’ report acknowledged that mandatory subordinated debt wouldincrease market discipline over major banks.  However, the report argued, a mandatory policywith “complex” features (e.g. , a rule that required issuance at regular intervals with limits on yieldspreads, and that forced LCBOs to shrink their assets if they could not issue qualifying debt)could impose “quite substantial costs.”134  In particular, the report warned that a mandatorysubordinated debt policy with “complex” features could have “severely pro-cyclical” effects,including a disruption of credit flows and an increase in “systemic risk” during economic crises.135 
The joint FRB-Treasury report concluded that, while further research and analysis shouldbe pursued, the “net benefits” of mandatory subordinated debt were “currently too uncertain tojustify adopting a mandatory policy.”136  A prominent analyst declared that the report had“dump[ed] buckets and buckets of cold water on the idea of using subordinated debt as a tool formarket discipline.”137
138  See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78Tex. L. Rev. 777, 780, 865-72 (2000); KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 208-21,310-12; Mahoney, supra note 42, at 56-58; STEINHERR, supra note 106, at 53-61, 274-76, 282-83.  Seealso supra notes 35-36 & 115-17 and accompanying text (referring to federal rescues of TBTF banks andthe FRB’s interventions in financial markets since 1970). 
139  See James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, Business Outlook: The Data Will Be Grim – ButGive the Fed a Chance, Bus. Week, Oct. 15, 2001, at 37 (sta ting that the FRB’s interest rate cuts dur ing2001 were “the most aggressive easing [of monetary policy] in the postwar era”); Wilmarth, Big Bank69
The opposition of federal regulators to  any strong form of market discipline is consistentwith their faithful adherence to the TBTF doctrine whenever they have determined that the failureof a large financial institution could destabilize the financial system.  TBTF bank rescues appear tobe part of a broader, unstated federal policy of maintaining stability within the financial markets. This implicit policy has grown out of the recognition that (i) major banks increasingly depend onthe health of the securities and derivatives markets, due to their leading role in those markets, and(ii) investments tied to the capital markets (including OTC derivatives, mutual funds, annuitiesand variable life insurance) account  for a rapidly growing percentage of the financial assets andrisk management tools of businesses and consumers.  The rescues of TBTF banks and the FRB’sinterventions in the financial markets since 1970 provide persuasive evidence of this regulatorycommitment to market stabilization as a key policy objective.138The FRB’s actions during the first  ten months of 2001 are consistent with an implicitpolicy of preventing serious market disruptions.  During that period, the FRB made nine cuts inshort-term interest rates and reduced those rates to their lowest level in almost four decades.  TheFRB’s act ions in 2001 resembled its aggressive reductions of short-term interest  rates during thebanking crisis and recession of the early 1990's, and again during the Russian debt crisis of1998.139  In July 2001, FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that the FRB was cutting interest
Mergers, supra note 26, at 45-46 (discussing the FRB’s similar actions during 1990-92); supra note 117and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s reduction in short-term interest rates during 1998).
140  Testimony of FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the House Comm. on Financial Services,July 18, 2001, reprinted in 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 588, 588-91 (quotes at 591).
141  Id. at 592 (emphasis added). 70
rates in response to a sharp downturn in the high-technology sector that had weakened thegeneral economy, lowered equity prices and produced a significant “decline in stock marketwealth.”140  In discussing the proper response to “asset price bubbles,” Chairman Greenspanrevealed the FRB’s underlying goal of stabilizing the financial markets:[O]ur only realistic response to a speculative bubble is to  lean against the economicpressures that may accompany a rise in asset prices, bubble or not, and addressforcefully the consequences of a sharp deflation in asset prices should theyoccur.141Similarly, in response to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September2001, the FRB flooded the financial markets with liquidity by purchasing more than $150 billionin government securities.  The FRB successfully prevented the occurrence of a prolonged liquiditycrunch in the markets, as it did during the stock market crash of 1987.  The FRB also reportedlysuspended the affiliate transaction rules under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, so thatmajor banks could make large t ransfers of funds to their securities affiliates.  Gerald Corrigan,who was President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the 1987 crash, defendedthe FRB’s actions in September 2001 as being essential to maintain stability in the financialmarkets: “This whole thing is a confidence game, and you better damn well think carefully ofanything that can shake . . . public confidence in the financial markets, and in particular, the stock
142  See Anita Raghavan et al., Team Effort: Banks and Regulators Drew Together to CalmMarkets After Attack, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A1 (quoting Mr. Corrigan and reporting on the FRB’swaiver of Section 23A); supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on affiliatetransactions under Section 23A).  
143  See supra notes 35-43, 115-18 and accompanying text.
144  See Robert T. Parry, Financial Services in the New Century, FRBSF Econ. Letter No. 98-15,Fed. Res. Bank of S.F., CA, May 8, 1998, at 2 (remarks by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’spresident); Hoenig, supra note 39, at 10-13 (speech by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’spresident); Stern, supra note 39, at 4-5, 24-26 (article by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’president).
145  Garver, Market as Regulator, supra note 137 (quoting analyst Karen Shaw Petrou).71
market.”142Few would question the wisdom of the FRB’s decisions to cut interest rates to counteracta serious economic downturn, or to provide emergency liquidity support through open-marketoperations during a stock market crash.  However, the FRB’s actions in arranging the rescue ofLTCM in 1998, and in waiving affiliate transaction rules for LCBOs in 2001, indicate that theFRB currently views the survival of major financial conglomerates as an indispensable element ofits broader mission to preserve market  stability.  Investors therefore have every reason to beconfident that the TBTF policy remains a centerpiece of U.S. financial regulation.143  In sum, the TBTF policy is the great unresolved problem of bank supervision, because itundermines the effectiveness of both regulatory oversight and market discipline with regard toLCBOs.144  A recent article in the American Banker summed up the current situation in thefollowing words: [A] lingering impression that the government will bail out any large institution that getsinto trouble has encouraged the markets to give financial institutions less scrutiny thanother businesses.  ‘Until the market has a credible expectation that discipline is required,’market discipline is ‘a long way off.’145
146  See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the banking industry’s opposition toFAS 115 and FAS 133).  In opposing “Pillar 3" of the Basel Committee’s January 2001 proposal,FleetBoston asserted that “[t]he disclosure requirements are fundamentally flawed and should be dropped. .. . The market is sufficiently well informed already.”  UBS agreed that the Basel Committee should forgoall mandatory public disclosures and should rely instead on confidential reports to bank supervisors. Merrill Lynch argued that “[i]f information is publicly disclosed that shows a firm has significant riskexposure and will require short-term funding, then it is unlikely that  the firm will be able to obtain afavorable funding rate as a result of this exposure.”  (In other words, Merrill Lynch opposed the proposeddisclosure requirements for credit risk because they would produce more effective market discipline!)  SeeBarbara A. Rehm, Making Basel Better: In Basel Tune-Up, Disclosure Slammed, Am. Banker, July 10,2001, at 1 (quoting statements by representatives of the three institutions).Perhaps the most distressing comment was offered by J.P. Morgan Chase, which warned that“[t]he snapshot nature of disclosure practices makes it virtually impossible for users to have an up-to-datepicture of a bank’s risk profile, given how dynamically portfolios can change.”  Id.  This comment supportsthe view of many analysts, who believe that regulators and market participants cannot effectively monitorLCBOs because of their rapidly expanding use of OTC derivatives and other complex, highly-leveragedfinancial instruments.  See supra notes 106 & 109 and accompanying text.
147  In September 2001, the Basel Committee released a revised version of its proposed “Pillar 3." In response to industry critics, the Basel Committee stated that its revisions “streamlin[ed] the proposals”for market discipline and made a “significant reduction” in the total amount of required public disclosure. Basel Comm. on Bank Supervision, Working Paper on Pillar 3 – Market Discipline, Sept. 2001, at 1(available at <www.bis.org>).  Notwithstanding these concessions, banking industry representativescontinued to attack the revised public disclosure proposal.  See Richard Cowden, Capital: Bank Industry72
Leading financial institutions recognize that their TBTF status insulates them to asignificant degree from market discipline, and they have consistently resisted proposals to increasetheir transparency to investors.  As noted above, big banks strongly opposed the adoption ofmarket-value accounting treatment for their trading assets during the 1990's.  More recently,major global financial institutions attacked “Pillar 3” of the Basel Committee’s January 2001proposal, which recommended public disclosure rules designed to assist  investors in evaluatingthe financial condition and operations of LCBOs.146  The harsh responses of leading  financialinstitut ions, together with subsequent concessions announced by the Basel Committee, havecreated further doubts about the prospects for establishing effective market discipline overfinancial conglomerates.147
Experts React Negatively To Working Papers on Basel Capital Accord, 77 BNA’s Banking Rep. 563(2001).
148  For a previous description of this proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank regulat ion anddeposit insurance, see Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 77-87.  As indicated in that article, Iam indebted to Robert Litan for many of the concepts incorporated in my two-tiered proposal.  See, e.g.,ROBERT E LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 164-89 (1987). 73
III. A New Regulatory Regime Is Needed to Counteract the Risk-Taking Incentives ofFinancial ConglomeratesGiven the shortcomings of current approaches to regulatory oversight and marketdiscipline, it is time to adopt a new regulatory program that has a better chance of reducing therisk-taking incentives of LCBOs.  As described below, my proposed program has three majorelements: (i) protecting the deposit insurance system from the expense of TBTF bailouts, (ii)requiring financial conglomerates to bear primary responsibility for the financial costs of suchbailouts, and (iii) implementing additional reforms designed to force major financial institutions tointernalize the costs of their risk-taking.   A. Insulating the Deposit Insurance System from TBTF BailoutsThe most effective way to protect the deposit insurance system from the cost of TBTFrescues is to create a two-tiered structure of bank regulation and deposit insurance.148  The firsttier would consist of “traditional” banking organizations that  limit their activities (including theactivities of all holding company affiliates) to lines of business that meet the “closely related tobanking” test in Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.  For example, this first tier of traditional bankscould take deposits, make loans and offer fiduciary services.  They could act as agents in sellingsecurities and insurance products underwritten by non-affiliated firms.  They could underwrite,purchase and deal in “bank-eligible” securities that national banks are permitted to underwrite or
149  Securities eligible for bank underwriting, investment and dealing include U.S. governmentsecurities, as well as general obligation securities and revenue bonds issued by state and local governments. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh) & 1831a; MCCOY, supra note 3, § 7.03 (explaining the difference between“bank-eligible” securities, which banks are permitted to underwrite, deal in or purchase, and “bank-ineligible” securities).  
150  See supra note 133 (discussing FASB’s adoption of FAS 133).
151  See Malloy, supra note 2, at 801 (observing that the GLB Act “freezes in place,” as ofNovember 12, 1999, the authority of nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies to engage inactivities that are “closely related to banking” under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. §1843(c)(8)).  In practical effect, the GLB Act forces bank holding companies to re-designate themselves asfinancial holding companies in order to engage in any new activities that are not on the grandfathered list  of“closely related” activit ies under  Section 4(c)(8),  but are approved as “financial in nature” under newSection 4(k) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).  Congress should revise Section 4(c)(8) so that theFRB has authority to approve a limited range of new activities that are “closely related” to the traditionalbanking functions of accepting deposits, extending credit, discounting negotiable instruments and providingfiduciary services.  See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 80 n.365, 84 & n.378.74
deal in direct ly.149  They could use derivatives for bona fide hedging transactions that qualify forhedging treatment under FAS 133.150  Virtually all of these traditional banks would be smaller,community-based banks, because those banks do not  have any comparative advantage – andtherefore have not shown any substantial interest – in engaging as principal in insuranceunderwriting, securities underwriting, derivatives dealing or other capital markets activities.  Incontrast, these community banks are well positioned to continue their established business ofattracting core deposits, providing relationship loans to consumers and firms, and providingwealth management services through their fiduciary operations. In order to  ensure reasonable competitive flexibility for this first tier of traditional banks,Congress should amend Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act by permitting the FRB to expand the listof “closely related” activities for holding company affiliates of tradit ional banks.  Unfortunately,the GLB Act removed the FRB’s authority to approve any new “closely related” activities forbank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8).151  Under my proposed amendment, Section
152  See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 84-86.
153  See, e.g., Broome & Markham, supra note 3,  at 743-44, 771-72 (describing how nonbankholding companies acquired FDIC-insured depository institutions under the “nonbank bank” and “unitarythrift” loopholes, and how those holding companies were “grandfathered” under a 1987 federal sta tute andthe GLB Act, respectively); Wilmarth,  Transformation, supra note 12, Part  II(C) (explaining that, duringthe 1980's and 1990's, many leading securities firms and life insurance companies used the “nonbank bank”and “unitary thrift” loopholes to acquire FDIC-insured banks and thrifts).
154  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(2), I(E) & II(C) (discussing the sharpdifferences between the operating stra tegies of major banks and nonbank financial conglomerates and thebusiness focus of smaller, community-oriented banks).75
4(c)(8) would allow the FRB to approve new types of financial services for holding companyaffiliates of first-tier banks as long as those services are “closely related” to traditional bankingfunct ions.  Traditional banks and their holding companies would continue to operate under theircurrent supervisory arrangements, and all of the banks’ deposits (up to the statutory limit)  wouldbe covered by deposit insurance.152   In contrast, depository institutions and their affiliates would be placed in the second tier of“nontraditional” banking organizations if they engage in (i) underwriting or trading in “bank-ineligible” securities, (ii) underwriting insurance (except for credit insurance), (iii) dealing ortrading in derivatives (except for bona fide hedging transactions recognized under FAS 133), or(iv) merchant banking.  Second-tier nontraditional banking organizat ions would include: (A)financial holding companies that decide to exercise any of the securities underwriting, merchantbanking and insurance underwriting powers granted by the GLB Act, (B) holding companiesowning grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (C) grandfathered “unitary thrift” holdingcompanies.153  Thus, second-tier nontraditional holding companies would encompass all of thelargest banking organizations, which are heavily engaged in capital markets activities, togetherwith other financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions.154      
155  See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 79-82.76
Under my proposal, all FDIC-insured depository institutions that are subsidiaries ofsecond-tier nontraditional holding companies would be required to adopt a “narrow bank”structure.  These narrow banks would hold all of their assets in the form of cash and highlymarketable debt obligations, such as qualifying government securities, highly-rated commercialpaper and other debt instruments eligible for investment by money market mutual funds(“MMMFs”) under rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  In addition, narrow bankscould not accept  any uninsured deposits.  Narrow banks would present a very small risk to theFDIC’s deposit insurance funds, because (i) each narrow bank’s assets would be “marked tomarket” on a daily basis, and the FDIC could therefore quickly determine whether a narrow bankwas threatened with insolvency, and (ii) the FDIC could quickly convert a narrow bank’s assetsinto cash if the FDIC decided to liquidate the bank to pay off the claims of its insureddepositors.155Given the foregoing asset restrictions, the FDIC would be largely protected from loss inthe event of a failure involving an insured narrow bank that was owned by a nontraditionalholding company.  In addition, my proposal would prevent  nontraditional holding companies andtheir nonbanking subsidiaries from exploiting the federal subsidy provided by deposit insurance. This goal would require three basic reforms designed to insulate the narrow bank from itsnonbank affiliates.  First, each insured narrow bank would be prohibited from engaging in anytransfers of funds or credit involving its affiliates, except for (i) the bank’s payment of dividendsout of profits to its parent holding company, and (ii) the bank’s receipt of capital infusions fromits parent holding company.  Second, if a narrow bank failed, the FDIC would be strictly
156  See supra note 35 (discussing the “systemic risk” exception under the Section 141 of FDICIA,which allows the FDIC, with the concurrence of the FRB and the Treasury Dept., to protect uninsuredcreditors in resolving a TBTF bank); Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 995-96 (explaining thatthe FDICIA requires the FDIC – except in a situation involving “systemic risk” – to choose the least costlymethod for resolving a bank failure, an approach that usually results in liquidating the bank’s assets andarranging for a transfer or payoff of the bank’s insured deposits).
157  See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(D)(4)(b)(iv) (discussing the FRB’s LOLRauthority). 77
prohibited from making payments to anyone who was not an insured depositor of the bank. Third, the “systemic risk” exception included in FDICIA would be abolished.  As a result,  theFDIC would be required to follow the least costly resolution procedure for all failed banks, andthe FDIC could no longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for protecting uninsuredcreditors of a failed bank or its nonbank affiliates.156  As discussed below, the FRB wouldundertake primary responsibility for TBTF problems under its LOLR powers.157Insulating the FDIC’s deposit insurance funds from the possibility of TBTF bailouts wouldhave several major benefits.   It would make clear to the financial markets that the FDIC’s depositinsurance funds could only be used to protect insured depositors of failed banks.  Uninsuredcreditors of a financial holding company – regardless of its size – would no longer have anyreasonable expectation of being protected by the FDIC if the holding company or any of itsbanking or nonbanking subsidiaries failed.  Shareholders and creditors of the holding companywould therefore have greater incentives to monitor its financial condition.  Moreover, the narrowbank format would eliminate the ability of financial conglomerates to exploit the deposit insurancesubsidy by orchestrating transfers of funds or credit from their insured depository subsidiaries tononbank affiliates.  Because all such transfers would be flatly prohibited (except for lawfuldividends paid by the bank and capital infusions made by the parent holding company),  bank
158  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Options Paper, Aug. 2000 [hereinafter cited as 2000 FDIC OptionsPaper], at 34.  See also Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 996-97 (explaining that, under Section141 of FDICIA, the FDIC must recover the cost of a “systemic risk” bailout by imposing a specialassessment on all FDIC-insured banks in proportion to their total assets).78
regulators would find it relatively easy to determine whether any unauthorized transfers weretaking place. A further benefit of my proposal is that traditional banks (which, as noted above, are likelyto be smaller banks) would no longer bear any part of the cost of rescuing uninsured creditors ofTBTF banks.  Under current law, all FDIC-insured banks must pay a special assessment (allocatedin proportion to their total assets) to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of protecting uninsuredclaimants in a “systemic risk” bailout.  The FDIC has noted the unfairness of expecting smallerbanks – which could never be the subject of a TBTF rescue – to help pay for “systemic risk”bailouts.  The FDIC has suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to remove the systemicrisk exception from the [FDI Act].”158  As already noted, such an amendment to the FDI Act is akey part of my proposal.  Critics have raised two major objections to the narrow bank concept.  First, critics pointout that the asset restrictions imposed on narrow banks would prevent them from acting asintermediaries of funds between depositors and borrowers.  As indicated above, most narrowbank proponents would require such banks to invest their deposits in safe, highly marketableassets such as those permitted for MMMFs.  Narrow banks would therefore be largely or entirelybarred from making commercial loans.  As a result, a banking system composed exclusively ofnarrow banks could not provide credit to small and midsized firms that lack access to the
159  See, e.g., John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, andPolicy, in OLIVIER J. BLANCHARD & STANLEY FISCHER, EDS., NBER MACROEC ONOM ICS ANNUAL 1993,at 319, 363; Neil Wallace, Narrow Banking Meets the Diamond-Dybvig Model, 20 Q.  Rev. No. 1,  Fed.Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Winter 1996, at 3.  See also Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26,at 79-81 (explaining that most narrow bank proposals would prohibit  narrow banks from makingcommercial loans, except perhaps for a limited basket of loans based on a fraction of their equity capital).79
securities markets.159     However, my two-tiered proposal should greatly reduce any disruption of the traditional role of banks in acting as intermediaries between depositors and business borrowers.  Myproposal would permit first-tier traditional banks to continue making commercial loans that arefunded by deposits.  As I have shown elsewhere, community-based banks make most of theircommercial loans in the form of longer-term “relationship” loans to small and midsized firms. Community banks have significant advantages in making such loans, because (i) their main officesare located in the communities where they make most of their commercial loans, thereby enablingtheir executives to be better informed about the character,  reputation and skills of local businessowners, (ii) they maintain greater continuity in their branch managers and loan officers, therebyallowing those officers to build stronger relationships with local business owners, and (iii) theyoperate in a relatively non-heirarchical and decentralized manner and therefore provide greaterflexibility to their loan officers and loan customers.  As indicated above, community banks are unlikely to enter the securities or insurancebusinesses (except in an agency capacity), and most of them would probably choose to becomefirst-tier traditional banks within my proposed two-tier structure.  Those banks could continue tocarry on their deposit-taking and lending activities without any change from current law, and theirprimary commercial lending customers would remain smaller firms that cannot obtain credit from
80
the securities markets.  While deposit insurance for first-tier traditional banks would provide apartial subsidy for their lending act ivities, I believe that such a subsidy is justified in view of (i) theimportance of the small business sector and its heavy reliance on bank credit, (ii) the effectivespecialization of community banks in providing relationship loans to small firms, and (iii) pastevidence indicating that relationship lending by community banks is a relatively safe and profitableactivity which has not been a source of significant losses to the deposit insurance funds in the past.   In contrast to community banks, most big banks do not make a substantial number ofrelationship loans to  small firms.  Instead, big banks provide credit to smaller firms primarilythrough highly-automated, “transaction-based” programs that (A) disburse loans in relativelysmall amounts (usually under $100,000) in a manner similar to credit card loans, (B) use highly-centralized and impersonal approval methods based on credit scoring, and (C) are designed topermit securitization of the loans into asset-backed securities that are sold to investors in thecapital markets. As indicated above, most large banks would become second-tier nontraditionalbanking organizations under my proposal, and their insured deposit-taking activities would beconducted through narrow banks.  Second-tier organizat ions would be required to conduct theirbusiness lending programs through nonbank finance subsidiaries, which could be funded by commercial paper and other debt instruments sold to investors in the capital markets.  Therequirement that second-tier banks use nonbank subsidiaries for their commercial loans should notcreate a substantial disincent ive for the small business lending programs currently offered by bigbanks, because a major portion of those programs is already financed by the capital marketsthrough securitization.  Thus, my two-tier proposal should not result in a significant disruption of
160  For more detailed discussions of the topics covered in the preceding three paragraphs, seeWilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 34-41, 79-83; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12,Parts I(D)(2) & (3).  For a recent study confirming that community banks have significant organizationaladvantages in providing  “relationship-based” loans to small firms, while large banks are likely to provideonly impersonal, “transaction-based” credit to such firms, see Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, SmallBusiness Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure,Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser. Working Paper 2001-36, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. (available at<www.federalreserve.gov>), Econ. J. (2002) (forthcoming).   
161  See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 39, at 689-90; Stern, supra note 39, at 25-26.81
bank lending, because big banks have largely moved away from traditional relationship-basedlending funded by deposits.  Instead, major banks provide transactions-based credit through loanprograms (e.g., securitization and syndication) that rely primarily on investors in the capitalmarkets for funding.160The second major criticism of narrow bank proposals is that they would lack credibility,because federal regulators would retain the inherent authority (whether explicit or implicit) toorganize bailouts of major financial firms during periods of severe economic distress. Accordingly, critics charge, the narrow bank concept simply shifts the TBTF problem from theinsured bank to its nonbank affiliates.161  I attempt to answer this criticism in the following section,in which I propose to transfer to the FRB – with important new restrictions – the responsibilityfor administering TBTF rescues. B. Assigning the FRB with Responsibility over TBTF Institutions Given its new role as umbrella supervisor of financial holding companies, as well as itstraditional authority over monetary policy and the payments system, the FRB is in the bestposition to deal with large financial conglomerates whose failure might create systemic risk in the
162  See supra note 4 (observing that the GLB Act designates the FRB as the “umbrella regulator”for financial holding companies); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. Cin. L.Rev. 441, 478-86 (1998) (proposing that,  in view of the FRB’s statutory responsibilities for establishingmonetary policy, regulating the payments system and supervising bank holding companies, the FRB shouldact as the “systemic risk regulator” with respect to financial conglomerates).  
163  The FRB has authority to act provide discount window loans to banks under 12 U.S.C. §§ 347,347a & 347b.  In addition, under 12 U.S.C. § 343, the FRB may extend discount window loans to nonbankentities in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”  Section 343, as amended in 1991, enables the FRB toprovide emergency liquidity support to securities firms and other nonbank firms after a major economicshock similar to the 1987 stock market crash.  See Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency LiquidityProvisions, 29 Econ. Rev. No. 3,  Fed. Res. Bank of Cleve., OH, 3d Qtr . 1993, at 16, 19-22; S.  Rep. No.167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 202-03 (1991). 
164  The two foregoing conditions would be similar to provisions currently embodied in the FDIC’s“systemic risk” authority under Section 141 of FDICIA.  See Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at996-97 (explaining that Section 141 requires the FDIC to (i) obtain the concurrence of the FRB and theTreasury Dept. before protecting any uninsured creditors of a TBTF bank, and (ii) to make a special expost assessment on the banking industry to recover the cost of any such bailout).82
financial markets.162  As LOLR, the FRB can provide emergency discount window advances toprevent or postpone the failure of a major financial institution or its affiliates.163  Thus, myproposed reform of the deposit insurance system would authorize the FRB to use its LOLRauthority to support large financial institutions in situations involving “systemic risk.”However, three reforms must be implemented to prevent the FRB from using its LOLR authority in a way that would encourage moral hazard and excessive risk-taking among largefinancial conglomerates.  First, the FRB should be required to obtain the Treasury Department’sconcurrence before making any discount window advances for the purpose of protecting creditors(other than holders of FDIC-insured deposits) of a failing financial institution or its affiliates. Second, the FRB should be obligated to recover the unpaid balance of any emergency advance byimposing a special assessment on other holding companies of the same class as the entity thatreceived the advance.164  This reform would require the FRB to charge all second-tier  depository
165  See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining that the proposed “second tier” of“nontraditional” banking organizations would include these three categories of holding companies).Similarly,  if the FRB provided an emergency discount window advance to protect the creditors of a  failingsecurities firm or insurance company that was not affiliated with an insured depository institution,  myproposal would require the FRB to make a special assessment on similar non-affiliated securities firms orinsurance companies to recover any unpaid balance of that advance.83
institut ion holding companies, in proportion to their total assets, for the unpaid balance of anydiscount window loan extended to a second-tier holding company.  As indicated above, thesecond-tier category would include (i) financial holding companies registered under Section 4(k)of the BHC Act, (ii) holding companies owning grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (iii)grandfathered “unitary thrift” holding companies.165  Potential liability for FRB special assessments would give each nontraditional holdingcompany a st rong incentive to monitor other second-tier organizations and to alert  the FRB if theholding company became aware of circumstances indicating that a competitor was takingexcessive risks or was otherwise exposed to losses that might threaten its solvency.  A system ofjoint liability and mutual discipline could be formalized by organizing second-tier holdingcompanies into one or more self-regulating clearinghouses.  Such clearinghouses could attractmembers based on a common geographic location or similar product offerings.  A clearinghousestructure would allow its members to establish rules for (i) monitoring the financial condition ofeach member, (ii) settling obligations between members, and (iii) providing assistance toweakened members during market disruptions.  Each clearinghouse could also organize a self-insurance system by requiring its members to make contributions to a reserve fund, which couldbe used to help members during financial emergencies or pay FRB special assessments for unpaid
166  For descriptions of the monitoring, liquidity and self-insurance services provided by privatebank clearinghouses to their members prior to the creation of the FRB and the FDIC, see, e.g., Charles W.Calomiris, U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective 8-10, 60, 71 (2000); David G. Oedel, PrivateInterbank Discipline, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 327, 344-60 (1993).
167  See, e.g., Feldman & Rolnick, supra note 35, at 11-16 (suggesting that uninsured creditors of aTBTF bank should be required to absorb a “coinsurance” deductible of up to 20% of their claims if thebank fails).  84
discount window loans to members.166   Under my third LOLR reform, the FRB could not make emergency advances to protectuninsured creditors of a depository institution or its affiliates unless a mandatory deduction, or“haircut,” was assessed against all uninsured claims.  Requiring about a 10% “haircut” wouldappear reasonable, as it would encourage uninsured creditors to exercise greater discipline overfinancial holding companies but would probably not be so great as to trigger contagious “runs” bylarge depositors, holders of commercial paper and other uninsured short-term creditors.167  TheFRB could be given discretion to waive this mandatory “haircut” in an except ional case involvinga systemic economic crisis.  However, as an appropriate disincentive, the FRB should be obligatedto use its own reserves to pay for the cost of such waivers.     Assigning responsibility for TBTF problems to the FRB is consistent with the two-tierregulatory structure suggested above.  The FRB would concentrate its supervisory attention ondiversified financial holding companies whose failure could create systemic risk concerns andadversely affect the conduct of monetary policy.  The same class of financial conglomerates wouldpay special assessments to cover the cost of TBTF bailouts.  As a result, those conglomerates (i)would have reduced moral hazard incentives to pursue high-risk activities, because they could nolonger shift their losses to the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund, and (ii) would have stronger
168  See supra notes 46-47; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,  Keeping the Promise: Recommendations forDeposit Insurance Reform, April 2001 (available at <www.fdic.gov>) [hereinafter cited as 2001 FDICReform Plan], at 2-5; Rob Blackwell, Solly’s Sweeps Show FDIC Fund Worries Still Apply, Am. Banker,Oct. 29, 2001, at 1. 85
incentives to monitor the risk profiles and financial soundness of their competitors.C. Three Additional Reforms to Increase Supervisory and Market Disciplineover Financial ConglomeratesThe proposals outlined above would significantly reduce the TBTF subsidy currentlyenjoyed by large financial conglomerates.  However, three further reforms are urgently needed tocorrect existing flaws in supervisory and market discipline.  First, Congress must repeal the 1996 law which forces the FDIC to provide free depositinsurance to more than 90% of all insured banks and thrifts.  As noted above, the 1996 legislationprevents the FDIC from collecting deposit insurance premiums from “well capitalized” and “wellmanaged” institut ions as long as the reserve ratio for each deposit insurance fund remains aboveits statutory minimum of 1.25%.  As a result, more than 900 recently-chartered depositoryinstitutions have never paid premiums on their insured deposits.  In addition, since 2000,Citigroup and Merrill Lynch have enabled their brokerage customers to transfer more than $75billion into insured deposit accounts at affiliated banks, again without paying any premiums to theFDIC.  By late 2001, the growth of insured deposits at these “free rider” institutions threatened toreduce the BIF’s reserve ratio below the statutory floor of 1.25%.168   Congress must bring an end to this unfair “free riding” on the deposit insurance funds. Congress can do so by amending the FDI Act in two respects.   The first  amendment wouldauthorize the FDIC to impose a retroactive risk-based assessment based on deposit growth atevery insured institution that has not paid deposit insurance premiums since December 31, 1996
169  The FDIC recently determined that an average assessment rate of 11.2 basis points would havebeen sufficient to equate premium revenues with expenses and losses incurred by the BIF during 1980-99. See 2000 FDIC Options Paper, supra note 158, at 24 & tbl. 3.  Accordingly, the FDIC should beauthorized to impose an average assessment rate of about 11 basis points (with appropriate variationsbased on the risk of each insured bank) on deposit growth at each insured bank that has not paid premiumssince 1996. 
170  In early 2001, the FDIC issued a detailed proposal calling for such legislation.  See 2001 FDICReform Plan, supra note 168.  
171  See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing broker-to-bank sweep programsestablished by Citigroup and Merrill Lynch). 86
(the effective beginning date for free deposit insurance).169  The second amendment would requireall FDIC-insured institutions to pay prospective risk-based premiums, regardless of theircapitalization and supervisory ratings.170A second reform is needed to ensure that financial conglomerates, like Citigroup andMerrill Lynch, assume full responsibility for the potential costs of their broker-dealer “sweep”programs.  As previously noted, these “sweep” programs circumvent the $100,000 ceiling ondeposit insurance by enabling brokerage customers to make structured transfers into insureddeposit accounts at  two or more affiliated banks.171  Under my two-tiered proposal for depositinsurance coverage, most of the moral hazard threat created by these “sweep” programs would beremoved.  As explained above, financial holding companies with broker-dealer affiliates would beallowed to accept insured deposits only within narrow banks.  In addition, strict limitat ions wouldbe imposed on transactions between narrow banks and their affiliates, thereby preventing narrowbanks from transferring their deposit insurance subsidy to nonbank affiliates.  To eliminate any further risk to the FDIC from “sweep” programs, I would expand thecross-guarantee provision of the FDI Act.  When an insured bank fails, the cross-guarantee statutecurrently allows the FDIC to assess all affiliated banks for the net cost of resolving the failed
172  See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e); Jackson, Holding Company Obligations, supra note 98, at 536-37.87
bank.172  The scope of the cross-guarantee provision should be extended to include affiliatedbroker-dealers whenever the FDIC can show that (i) an affiliated broker-dealer assisted customers in making structured transfers of funds into insured deposit accounts at two or moreaffiliated banks, and (ii) those st ructured t ransfers produced, in practical effect, an evasion of thedeposit insurance limits and thereby increased the FDIC’s net cost of handling the failure of anyaffiliated bank.         My third set of reforms would be aimed at increasing market discipline over majorfinancial conglomerates.  For example, federal regulators should promptly implement “Pillar 3" ofthe proposed new Basel accord, which would require LCBOs to provide more extensive andtimely disclosures to investors about their risk exposures and risk management systems.  Inaddition, regulators should require LCBOs to issue publicly-traded senior or subordinated debtsecurities on a frequent basis.  I would permit regulators to experiment with publicly-traded debtrequirements over a period of five years and then report to Congress on the prospects foradopting a more formalized system of market-based discipline (e.g., a program requiring LCBOsto issue qualifying subordinated debt on a continuous basis, with mandatory PCA sanctions forinstitutions that are unable to do so).  Regulators should also revise their monitoring systems to incorporate signals from thecapital markets.  Recent studies have shown that regulatory oversight would be more effective ifsupervisors frequently reviewed market signals such as (i) equity securities prices, (ii) yieldspreads and ratings on senior and subordinated debt securities, and (iii) interest rates paid onuninsured deposits and interbank loans.  While market discipline is unlikely to replace supervisory
173  See, e.g., Berger, Davies & Flannery, supra note 97; DeYoung et al., supra note 97; RonFeldman & Mark Levonian, Market Data and Bank Supervision: The Transition to Practical Use, 15Region No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Sept. 2001, at 11; Jeffery W. Gunther, Mark E.Levonian & Robert R. Moore, Can the Stock Market Tell Bank Supervisors Anything They Don’t  AlreadyKnow?, Econ. & Fin. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, TX, 2d Qtr. 2001, at 2.88
oversight within the foreseeable future, market-based signals would provide regulators withhelpful tools for analyzing the financial condition and potential risks of large, publicly-tradedfinancial institutions.173 Conclusion The U.S. financial services industry has been fundamentally restructured over the pastquarter century, culminating in the emergence of big universal banks and other large financialconglomerates.  The GLB Act ratified this ongoing consolidation of the financial services industryby authorizing financial holding companies to engage in a wide range of act ivities that  transcendthe traditional boundaries separating banks from securities firms and insurance companies.  Unfortunately, regulatory policies have not kept pace with the challenges of supervisingfinancial conglomerates.  These giant institutions present formidable risks to the federal safety netand are largely insulated from both market discipline and supervisory intervention.  Leading bankshave aggressively pursued expansion strategies designed to achieve TBTF status, which providesguaranteed access to low-cost funding and regulatory concessions.  International and domestic regulators have tinkered with supervisory policies in the vainhope that revised capital rules, better oversight procedures and increased disclosures to investorswill induce financial conglomerates to adopt prudent risk management policies.  However, theunmistakable lesson of the past three decades is that regulators will protect major financial firmsagainst failure whenever such action is deemed necessary to preserve the stability of the capital
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markets.  As a consequence, financial institutions understand that they can increase their leverageand pursue more risky activities as they grow in size and complexity.  Without a comprehensivereform of the current regulatory structure, financial conglomerates will continue to exploit thesubsidies provided under the TBTF policy and other components of the federal safety net.  This paper proposes a fundamental overhaul of the current regulatory system for  financialconglomerates.  Under my plan, diversified banking organizations would be allowed to acceptinsured deposits only through narrow banks.  Strict  limitat ions on affiliate transactions wouldprevent  narrow banks from transferring their deposit insurance subsidy to nonbank affiliates.  TheFDIC’s deposit insurance funds would be used solely to pay insured depositor claims and wouldbe completely insulated from the potential cost of TBTF bailouts.  The FRB would bear primaryresponsibility for dealing with financial failures involving systemic risk, and the cost of TBTFrescues would be borne entirely by the TBTF policy’s potential beneficiaries  – viz., largefinancial conglomerates.  Three additional measures would increase the effectiveness ofsupervisory and market discipline over universal banks.  In combination, these reforms wouldsignificantly reduce the incentives for excessive risk-taking that currently exist in our financialsystem. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. 
